PIP-38: Re-electing Michael O'Rourke to the Foundation



We decentralized Pocket Network too early in its lifecycle. The decision to launch the DAO shortly after Pocket’s launch and subsequent decision to separate the responsibilities of Grove (formerly Pocket Network, Inc.) in two entities, in mid-2022, was partly legal and mostly philosophical. Building the network from the United States, we needed to give control to the community as soon as possible to avoid the ire of the SEC. More importantly, we are creating institutions. Having one person be the final decision maker for a protocol that is cross-border and has no opinion on jurisdictional laws results in a fragile system.

In this vein, we opted to give as much to the community as possible which led to many unquantifiable benefits for the community. It’s difficult to determine the cause-and-effect relationships but I believe from people building out products and gaining votes, there was and continues to be an unquantifiable benefit from stakeholders sticking around the last two years and continuing to build.

The first proposals to reduce inflation were seminal for Pocket Network. These were purely community driven. The involvement of everyone within these proposals is one of the things I am most proud of –- it felt that it was possible to involve a truly democratic DAO to push forward long term beneficial changes.

In addition, until January 2023, the entire operational burden of the network was under Grove. As we evolved the business at Grove, stepping down from the Foundation made sense. Grove focused on the business, while the Foundation was operationalized to focus on the network. This further decentralized Pocket, giving agency to an organization with no legal ties to Grove. Over time, PNF formulated its own vision and road map, which it has been executing to this day.

In hindsight, this was the wrong decision. We prematurely decentralized the DAO and the Foundation.

In 2022, Pocket Network had not reached true product market fit, despite relay growth and price telling us otherwise. Fully decentralizing the network has slowed us down in decision-making and fractured priorities at Grove, PNF, and the community:

  • Grove has been focused on revenue, quality of service, and shipping Shannon
  • PNF has been focused on long-term adoption of gateways, governance, and liquidity
  • The DAO has been focused on tweaking the economic parameters of the protocol

The result of these decisions lies before us. While we had reached all-time highs for the price of $POKT in 2022, the fact is that the network has been at risk of stagnation. I helped set a culture that has always under-indexed the price of $POKT in favor of building the products that drive usage and adoption for developers. This has led to a lack of prioritization of economic mechanisms and marketing efforts to drive the adoption of the network for $POKT token holders. The key learning I have had over the last two years is that the price of $POKT is the ultimate arbiter of our success. We can have all of the adoption in the world, but we will fall behind companies with more capital to invest because they are more liquid and are worth more than Pocket Network. If Pocket Network was worth billions of dollars today, I wouldn’t be advocating for this change.

It is under this backdrop that I have made the decision to submit this proposal to take over as steward of the Pocket Network Foundation. My proposal is the following:

  1. Re-elect me as the sole director of Pocket Network Foundation
  2. Give the Foundation sole discretion over as the DAO treasury and the ACL address to make parameter changes to Pocket Network
  3. An incentive-based compensation package based on shipping Shannon and the price of $POKT

I am advocating for taking control of the economic parameters of the protocol to be able to sprint. I am advocating to control the DAO treasury to continue to distribute POKT to the community for the hard work being done. I do not claim to have all the answers. I am a left-curve founder. It would be irresponsible of me to make changes in a smoky, back room without the brilliant people of this community poking holes in my, or anyone else’s ideas.

I believe I am the right person to drive the growth of this vision, because I have led the only team that has built not one, but two versions of Pocket Network, has sourced, sold, and driven the overwhelming majority of network traffic over 4 years, and have built our entire business, generating millions in revenue over the last 2 years, on top of a web3 backend.

On the current Foundation

I am not disparaging the Foundation’s efforts or integrity. I would keep several of the core work streams that are currently in flight and are critical to our success. This includes the following:

  • Multichain $wPOKT efforts
  • Gateway-verse
  • Exchanges
  • POPs and Sockets
  • Incorporating community contributions

That said, we need to reset the culture and have unified leadership under one vision.

Specifically, I am interested in doing the following at a high level, with the details of the changes specification section of this proposal:

Helping the Supply Side (Node Runners)

  • Change the number of maximum chains/services that can be staked per Pocket node
  • Adjust the network inflation rate to be temporarily higher in times of high traffic periods

Helping the Demand Side (Gateways)

  • Increase the emission rate of newly launched chains/services to be 10x higher for six months
  • Full rebates for the gateway fee mechanism to remove barriers to entry for gateways

Helping the Protocol

  • Taking leadership of the Foundation
  • Increase the DAO Allocation
  • Implement a concrete marketing strategy to drive net new POKT purchasers
  • Reposition Pocket Network to be more AI-forward

Aligning incentives

  • A milestone-based grant for shipping Shannon
  • An incentivized compensation package based on the price of POKT

The motivation for this proposal revolves around being able to push my vision for this protocol more quickly, assuming we agree on my philosophy for turning this around. I care more about the “why”, not the “how”. Ultimately, to maximize our odds of success, you can boil this proposal down to my belief that we need unified leadership and execution at this crucial time for Pocket Network.


When I, and my original co-founders, first designed Pocket Network as a system, the DAO and Foundation were critical parts to the eventual resilience and success of the protocol. A slower moving democratic DAO is meant to provide the checks and balances for a Foundation that has more autonomy is necessary for a foundational protocol providing decentralized access to data across the open internet.


Every POKT token holder will agree that we have some of the best fundamentals in the industry. Some highlights are:

  • Shannon, a full rewrite of Morse, and a true technological innovation, is expected to launch this year.
  • We have multiple gateways excited to build on top of Pocket, despite it being permissioned and difficult.
  • We are no longer just RPC - Grove’s AI pilot is in flight, with our Litepaper released.
  • Our forum, consistently active, has some of the smartest and deepest-thinking community members in the space.
  • $POKT is one of the most decentralized cryptocurrencies in the world - to my knowledge no one person or entity owns more than 7% of the supply.
  • $POKT is effectively fully unlocked - we have never played low-float games.
  • Grove’s Quality of Service is world-class. We have multiple centralized RPC providers as customers of ours.
  • Grove has material, growing revenue despite a hypercompetitive market where many RPC providers provide it for free.
  • To my knowledge, Grove is the only web3 infrastructure company in the world that has an SLA with hundreds of paying customers fully dependent on a permissionless protocol.

When I see on x.com “when $5 POKT”, the above fundamentals are why I believe this is possible, but the market doesn’t reflect this reality. I share the same immense frustration as all $POKT holders. I believed the market would acknowledge what we have built, and lead to a natural value accrual. This has not proven to be the case. We need something to change.


Here are the primary challenges I am seeing today:

  • The first, and most important - We have no new demand for the token.
    • Suppliers don’t earn enough APY/APR to justify net new buyers of $POKT coming in.
    • Gateways are not enough of an offset alone to drive value accrual to $POKT in the short to medium term.
    • Gateways allow $POKT to find an eventual equilibrium and provide stability for both the supply and demand of the token.
  • We have tens of thousands of $POKT holders who believed in us, and now are down big or have exited the ecosystem.
  • The above point has led to Pocket Network having a perception problem across the broader industry. I have personally heard from investors (and I speak to nearly everyone), that people think Pocket Network is dead or dying, that the service is not good, that we move too slow, bad tokenomics, etc.
  • Governance moves too slowly to adapt to changing conditions.
    • We have 60+ DAO voters managing $100M (at time of publication) in market cap, which is a bureaucratic nightmare.
    • While these checks and balances are important for governing a protocol that is worth many billions of dollars, the reality is that we have to go through too many processes to make decisions, and even more to iterate if they need to change.
  • Liquidity has always been bad. I’d argue the best, and most liquid time to be able to buy and sell POKT was when it was just through the various OTC telegram chats.
  • We have not been good at capturing the narrative. The only time we truly did was when relays went from 10M a day to over 1B in 10 months. Decentralized RPC was new, and we were the first to prove it was possible at scale. We have been hanging on this since 2022 and it’s old news.

Every $POKT holder who is still here believes in our mission. You see the hard work happening. At the end of the day the mission doesn’t matter if $POKT price performance doesn’t reflect the work we are doing. Pocket Network will die, and we’ll see competitors end up being the winners in the market.

Grove, who are the primary architects and customers of the protocol, and who have been able to build a business under these conditions, believe the following to be true about Pocket Network:

  • There will be a cambrian explosion of services that POKT will be able to serve, with each new service increasing the total addressable market of the network
  • Pocket Network is positioned to settle traffic for all manner of these open-source platforms, be it blockchains, LLMs, social protocols, storage protocols, etc.
  • At the current stage of the network, all barriers to attracting gateways must be removed to help drive current and future demand
  • At the current stage of the network, all barriers to diversifying the number of specialized infrastructure providers must be removed to help service this expected demand

Pocket Network has the potential to become a runaway train. Part of the motivation behind this proposal comes from my belief that we need to drastically shift our economic philosophy.

We can and should fix this.

My Economic Philosophy

George Soros defines the negative feedback loop we’re experiencing as Reflexivity, Market participants’ perceptions influence market fundamentals, which in turn influence participants’ perceptions.

We have been in a negative feedback loop with the price of POKT since the introduction of WAGMI. For those who remember, POKT price was driven purely by supply side incentives and demand for the POKT token. Before WAGMI, dynamic inflation, and had the expectation of “the tenthening” - when we hit 1B POKT, the POKT minted per relay would be cut by 10. At the time, the price of $POKT made the tenthening too extreme of a cut. We all agreed that the existing rate of inflation was unsustainable - yet the introduction of a stable inflation has removed us from one of the most important cryptonetwork properties, reflexivity.

Reflexivity has had us experience all of the downside and none up the upside. I want to bring Pocket Network back to creating economic opportunities for net new $POKT purchasers in a safe and sustainable manner.

In addition, we need to introduce resilience mechanisms that will address the downside effects of reflexivity and instill confidence in the economics of Pocket Network. Nassim Taleb calls this anti-fragility and defines it as such:

“Some things benefit from shocks; they thrive and grow when exposed to volatility, randomness, disorder, and stressors.”

We need to shock ourselves out of our situation and we believe we can do that by having more flexibility to experiment with parameters that govern the tokenomics of the protocol without litigating every change.

We do this by enabling a bottom and upper limit for inflation and immediately adjusting to the lower limit when we hit the upper limit. We keep our lower limit at ~5%, and do not adjust inflation rates until we hit 50%. We then cut back to 5% immediately. This dynamic, like parts of the world that need to deal with natural disasters, embrace the reflexivity of crypto while introducing shocks to the system that participants can get accustomed to.

If I am successful in retaking my role in the Foundation as its Executive Director, I plan on immediately adjusting parameters on Morse that deliver this shock. We cannot control the crypto market, we cannot control the macro market; we CAN control the incentives and dynamics of Pocket Network.


Parameter Changes

We’re going to move fast and iterate on all parameter changes. The proposals below are a starting point but expect them to change if things don’t work. In the same way that startups iterate fast, experiment and adapt based on user feedback, we can use the price of $POKT to ignore what doesn’t work and double down on what does. We’ll make sure to communicate everything ahead of time as changes are introduced.

Note that the details below are here to provide a rough idea of the parameters and values that’ll be used, but will be modified as a result of network traffic. We will share a spreadsheet of our plans & calculations in due course.

1. Target non-DAO Inflation

  • On-chain parameter: RelaysToTokensMultiplier
  • Target Start Value: 20%
  • Target Reset Value: 10%
  • On-chain value: RTTM will be initially adjusted to achieve 20% inflation based on today’s relay volume (i.e. network traffic). A combination of traffic growth and time-bound evaluation, it’ll dictate how these parameters will continue to change. For example, we’ll readjust if traffic jumps and aggregate inflation goes to 30%. If traffic does not change for 6 months, we will reduce inflation. Further details will be shared with the community along the way.
  • Reasoning: To leverage reflexivity and market dynamics. RTTM is currently adjusted weekly regardless of network traffic. By adjusting RTTM when the protocol grows, we can take advantage of increased rewards for node runners as traffic grows.

2. New Chain Emissions

  • On-chain parameter: RelaysToTokensMultiplierMap
  • Target Start Value: 10x RTTM
  • Target End (Reset) Value: Baseline RTTM
  • Proposed Change: Add an entry to RTTMMap for every new chain introduced. Six months after it is onboarded, it’ll be removed from the map and default to the baseline RTTM. Note that while evaluating the impact of this change, we’ll explore other thresholds (e.g. trailing average of traffic) as an alternate signal to reset the value as a function of our learnings.
  • Reasoning:

1. Bootstrapping Tax - Launching a new chain on POKT Network has a chicken-egg problem. Each new chain must be bootstrapped onto the network by the Gateway onboarding it, leading to an upfront off-chain expenditure/tax. This tax must be paid until sufficient demand is brought online by one or more gateway customers, which takes weeks to months to generate.
2. Network expansion - By increasing the emission rate during a chain launch window (e.g. 3 months), and then progressively lowering as critical adoption is reached on the network, the burden of onboarding new services is lessened. This makes it more cost-effective for gateways to launch chains, and their ability to negotiate deals that are orders of magnitude lower than centralized providers

3. Node Runner Minimum Stake

  • On-chain parameter: StakeMinimum, ServicerStakeFloorMultiplier
  • Current Value: 15,000,000,000 uPOKT == 15,000 POKT (~$1,200 at $0.08 per POKT).
  • New Value: 5,000 POKT (~$350 at $0.07 per POKT).
  • Reason: Lower the barrier to entry for new node operators, encouraging greater participation and decentralization. This number is high enough to avoid a disincentive for existing POKT holders to exit their stake, yet materially reducing the barrier of entry for new POKT purchasers. If successful in value capture, we would continue adjusting this parameter to keep the value of running a POKT node within the $250 - $500 range. Note that the Stake Weighted floor would be adjusted in accordance StakeMinimum, while ServicerStakeWeightCeiling will remain at 60,0000 POKT until we see opportunity to adjust it for network growth as well. Implementation can be found here.

4. DAO Allocation

  • Current Value: 10%
  • On-chain parameter: DAOAllocation
  • New Value: 75%
  • Adaptation: We will adapt this parameter to maintain Node/Validator inflation aligned with the current schedule as annual inflation id adjusted.
  • Reasoning:
    • This will become a perpetual funding source to fund protocol development and ecosystem initiatives.
    • The protocol team has always been funded by Grove. Due to having to split our funds between building the business, and building the protocol, we have not always been able to recruit or retain the level of talent we need. This will go a long way in addressing this issue.
    • I plan on supporting many of the existing public goods initiatives and using this larger DAO take to help fund them and future ones.

5. Burn For Gateways (ARR)

  • Current Value: $0.00000085 per relay ($0.85/million-relays)
  • New Value: $0.00000085 per relay but with full rebate from DAO treasury
  • Reasoning: As mentioned above, Grove’s goal is to grow the number of gateways sending traffic to POKT in a sovereign way, and we want to remove all barriers to entry. Having to account for the cost of a protocol burn at this stage of the project is prohibitive to onboarding new gateways, especially those that are starting out and don’t have a large POKT treasury to start with.

Execution plan for the Foundation

DAO Treasury and Parameter Execution

Put the DAO and Constitution on pause with all governance mechanisms for 24 months. After 24 months we re-instate the ability for the DAO to vote in or out new directors. The following sections from the Articles and Constitution should be amended during this period:

Current Constitution and Proposed Adjustments

Section 4.7-4.10: Foundation Deferral to DAO

Current Sections: 4.7 New Directors/Supervisors will be appointed/removed according to PIPs approved by the Council. 4.8 The Foundation’s Articles compel the agents of the Foundation to give full notice to the Council concerning: 4.9 The Directors and Supervisors of the Foundation can refuse the Council’s decisions subject to limitations. 4.10 The Foundation shall serve as a custodial entity for Pocket Network, deferring decision-making to the Council in all cases except Material Adverse Exception Events (MAEEs).

Proposed Adjustment: Suspend deferral of the Foundation to the DAO for 24 months.

Example: 4.7 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, the appointment and removal of Directors/Supervisors shall be determined solely by the sole director without requiring PIPs approved by the Council.

4.8 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, the Foundation’s agents shall not be required to give notice to the Council concerning any appointments or removals.

4.9 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, the Directors and Supervisors of the Foundation shall not be subject to the limitations imposed by the Council’s decisions.

4.10 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, the Foundation shall not defer decision-making to the Council, except in cases of Material Adverse Exception Events (MAEEs).

Section 6.3: PIP Votes

Current Section: 6.3 PIP votes will last 7 days and pass with Majority Approval, unless otherwise specified in this Constitution.

Proposed Adjustment: Allow the sole director to bypass PIP votes for 24 months.

Example: 6.3 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, the sole director shall have the authority to implement changes without requiring PIP votes to last 7 days and pass with Majority Approval.

Section 6.8: Majority Approval for Parameters

Current Section: 6.8 All other On-Chain parameters not specified above will be governed using Majority Approval in votes lasting 7 days.

Proposed Adjustment: Allow the sole director to govern all On-Chain parameters for 24 months without majority approval.

Example: 6.8 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, the sole director shall have the authority to govern all On-Chain parameters without requiring majority approval in votes lasting 7 days.

Section 7.2: Distribution of Treasury Funds

Current Section: 7.2 It is forbidden to propose or approve unconditional general distributions of the Pocket Core DAO Treasury to token holders, which may be misconstrued as dividends.

Proposed Adjustment: Allow the sole director to manage the distribution of Treasury funds for 24 months.

Example: 7.2 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, the sole director shall have the authority to manage the distribution of the Pocket Core DAO Treasury funds without restriction.

Section 8.11: Protocol Upgrades

Current Section: 8.11 Protocol Upgrades (including changes to the ACL) will be approved by the Council according to the PIP process.

Proposed Adjustment: Allow the sole director to approve Protocol Upgrades for 24 months without the PIP process.

Example: 8.11 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, Protocol Upgrades (including changes to the ACL) shall be approved by the sole director without requiring the PIP process.

Section 8.14: Foundation Article Amendments

Current Section: 8.14 Because Supervisor decisions are not valid unless ratified by the Council, no upgrade can be made to the Foundation’s Articles without the Council first signaling approval.

Proposed Adjustment: Allow the sole director to amend the Foundation’s Articles for 24 months without requiring DAO approval.

Example: 8.14 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, the sole director shall have the authority to amend the Foundation’s Articles without requiring approval from the Council.

Current Articles and Proposed Adjustments

Article 1.5: Requirement for DAO Resolution

Current Article: 1.5 Unless otherwise specified herein, no Ordinary Resolution or Special Resolution passed by persons entitled to attend and vote at a general meeting shall be valid or take effect until such Ordinary Resolution or Special Resolution has been approved by Supermajority DAO Resolution.

Proposed Adjustment: Remove the requirement for Supermajority DAO Resolution approval for 24 months.

Example: 1.5 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, all Ordinary Resolutions or Special Resolutions passed by persons entitled to attend and vote at a general meeting shall not require approval by Supermajority DAO Resolution and shall be valid and take effect upon passage.

Article 4.5: Appointment of Directors

Current Article: 4.5 Subject to Article 4.6, a director may be appointed by Ordinary Resolution. Where a director has for any reason either been removed or has resigned, the directors of the Company may appoint a temporary director to fill such vacancy until such time as the DAO shall direct the appointment of a new director by DAO Resolution.

Proposed Adjustment: Allow the sole director to appoint new directors and fill vacancies for 24 months.

Example: 4.5 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, the sole director shall have the power to appoint new directors and fill any vacancies without requiring an Ordinary Resolution or DAO Resolution.

Article 4.6: Resignation from Other Positions

Current Article: 4.6 Notwithstanding any other provision in these Articles, any person appointed as a director must resign from any positions of executive or managerial authority in the DAO before being appointed to their role as director.

Proposed Adjustment: Suspend the requirement for directors to resign from other DAO positions for 24 months.

Example: 4.6 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, any person appointed as a director shall not be required to resign from other positions of executive or managerial authority in the DAO.

Article 4.8: Removal of Directors

Current Article: 4.8 A director may be removed by Ordinary Resolution.

Proposed Adjustment: Allow the sole director to remove directors for 24 months.

Example: 4.8 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, the sole director shall have the power to remove directors without requiring an Ordinary Resolution.

Article 4.17: Compliance with DAO Resolutions

Current Article: 4.17 Subject to any limitation imposed on any director pursuant to each director’s fiduciary duties to the Company and all applicable law and these Articles, the directors shall observe, implement, carry out, action and execute with best efforts any and all DAO Resolutions.

Proposed Adjustment: Suspend the requirement for directors to comply with DAO Resolutions for 24 months.

Example: 4.17 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, the directors shall not be required to observe, implement, carry out, action, or execute DAO Resolutions.

Article 4.35: Disclosure of Information

Current Article: 4.35 The directors shall give to the DAO and to the general meeting (or the persons who have the right to attend the general meeting) such reports, accounts, information and explanations concerning: (a) the Company’s business and affairs; and
(b) the discharge of the directors’ duties and the exercise of their powers,
as may be required by a DAO Resolution of the Company.

Proposed Adjustment: Suspend the requirement for directors to disclose information to the DAO for 24 months.

Example: 4.35 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, the directors shall not be required to give reports, accounts, information, and explanations to the DAO.

Article 4.38: Director Compensation

Current Article: 4.38 A director or officer shall only be remunerated for services rendered. Any agreement between the Company and a director or officer concerning the remuneration of such director or officer shall be null and void where such agreement: (a) entitles such director or officer to participate in any distribution, dividend or transfer of assets of the Company or awards or entitles such director or officer to any profits or any assets of the Company, except where the transfer or entitlement of assets is in the form of a POKT token grant subject to at least 3 years vesting; or (b) sets the remuneration according to a percentage of the turnover, income, profits or earnings of the Company; or (c) agrees to remunerate the director or officer for an aggregate sum exceeding US$300,000 per annum (as of January 2023), adjusted annually for inflation by reference to the Consumer Price Index as measured by The Bureau of Labor Statistics, where such aggregate sum includes the annual vesting amount of any POKT token grant, and the value of the per annum vesting of such POKT grant will be determined by the prevailing market price as at the time of the grant and shall not exceed 50% of the director’s US$ salary.

Proposed Adjustment: Allow new compensation agreements for directors and officers for 24 months, including performance-based incentives.

Example: 4.38 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, the sole director may establish new compensation agreements for directors and officers, including performance-based incentives tied to the price of $POKT, without being subject to the existing limitations in Article 4.38.

Article 4.42-4.44: DAO Oversight on Foundation Spending

Current Article: 4.42 Financial transparency reports should be published quarterly by way of DAO Notice within the first 4 weeks following the end of the previous quarter. These should include management accounts showing actual spending vs the budget, an updated balance sheet, and cash flow forecast.

4.43 Annual budgets should be published by way of DAO Notice at least 4 weeks prior to the start of the 12-month period to which they relate. The budget should include director remuneration reported on a per-director basis, total contractor remuneration, and any other material expenses categorized as the directors reasonably see fit. The budget shall be automatically approved in full unless there is a DAO Resolution contesting any line item.

4.44 Subject to any limitation imposed on the directors by any confidentiality agreement, financial regulation, or related laws, the following special transactions shall be published by way of DAO Notice no fewer than 4 weeks prior to the transaction date and shall be automatically approved unless there is a DAO Resolution rejecting them.

Proposed Adjustment: Suspend DAO oversight on Foundation spending for 24 months, allowing sole director control.

Example: 4.42 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, financial transparency reports shall be provided to the sole director for internal review instead of being published by way of DAO Notice.

4.43 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, annual budgets shall be approved and managed solely by the sole director without requiring publication by way of DAO Notice.

4.44 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, special transactions shall be approved and managed solely by the sole director without requiring publication by way of DAO Notice.

Article 6.3-6.6: Appointment of Supervisors

Current Article: 6.3 With the exception of the first supervisor, the DAO may direct by way of Supermajority DAO Resolution that the directors appoint a person named in such Supermajority DAO Resolution as a supervisor of the Company either as an additional supervisor or to replace a supervisor.

6.4 Where the DAO has directed the directors by way of Supermajority DAO Resolution to appoint an additional supervisor, the directors and the Secretary shall undertake all action required to ensure that the additional supervisor named by such Supermajority DAO Resolution is properly appointed and registered in the register of supervisors of the Company.

6.5 Where the DAO has directed the directors by way of Supermajority DAO Resolution to replace an existing supervisor, the directors shall: (a) appoint the new supervisor named in the Supermajority DAO Resolution and, together with the Secretary, shall ensure that the new supervisor named by such Supermajority DAO Resolution is registered in the register of supervisors of the Company; and (b) immediately following the proper appointment of the new supervisor, remove the outgoing supervisor.

6.6 Where no supervisor has been appointed or where all supervisors have for any reason either been removed or have resigned, the directors of the Company must appoint a temporary supervisor to fill such vacancy until such time as the DAO shall direct the appointment of a new supervisor by Supermajority DAO Resolution. The temporary supervisor may be a director of the Company.

Proposed Adjustment: Allow the sole director to appoint and replace supervisors for 24 months without DAO approval.

Example: 6.3 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, the sole director shall have the power to appoint supervisors without requiring a Supermajority DAO Resolution.

6.4 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, the sole director shall have the power to appoint additional supervisors and ensure their proper appointment and registration without requiring a Supermajority DAO Resolution.

6.5 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, the sole director shall have the power to replace existing supervisors and ensure their proper appointment and registration without requiring a Supermajority DAO Resolution.

6.6 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, the sole director shall have the power to appoint temporary supervisors without requiring a Supermajority DAO Resolution.

Article 6.8: Removal of Supervisors

Current Article: 6.8 The DAO may direct by way of Supermajority DAO Resolution that the directors remove a person named in such Supermajority DAO Resolution as a supervisor of the Company. For the avoidance of doubt, the directors cannot remove any supervisor unless upon the instruction of a Supermajority DAO Resolution.

Proposed Adjustment: Allow the sole director to remove supervisors for 24 months.

Example: 6.8 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, the sole director shall have the power to remove supervisors without requiring a Supermajority DAO Resolution.

Article 6.17: Compliance with DAO Resolutions

Current Article: 6.17 Subject to any limitation imposed on any supervisor pursuant to each supervisor’s fiduciary duties to the Company and all applicable law and these Articles, the supervisors shall observe, implement, carry out, action and execute with best efforts any and all DAO Resolutions.

Proposed Adjustment: Suspend the requirement for supervisors to comply with DAO Resolutions for 24 months.

Example: 6.17 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, the supervisors shall not be required to observe, implement, carry out, action, or execute DAO Resolutions.

Article 22: Transfer by Way of Continuation

Current Article: 22.1 The Company may, by Special Resolution, resolve to be registered by way of continuation in a jurisdiction outside: (a) the Islands; or (b) such other jurisdiction in which it is, for the time being, incorporated, registered or existing.

22.2 To give effect to any resolution made pursuant to the preceding Article, the directors may cause the following: (a) an application to be made to the Registrar of Companies to deregister the Company in the Islands or in the other jurisdiction in which it is for the time being incorporated, registered or existing; and (b) all such further steps as they consider appropriate to be taken to effect the transfer by way of continuation of the Company.

Proposed Adjustment: Grant the sole director the authority to resolve and execute the transfer by way of continuation for 24 months.

Example: 22.1 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, the sole director may resolve to register the Company by way of continuation in a jurisdiction outside: (a) the Islands; or (b) such other jurisdiction in which it is, for the time being, incorporated, registered or existing.

22.2 For a period of 24 months from the date of this proposal passing, to give effect to any resolution made pursuant to the preceding Article, the sole director may cause the following: (a) an application to be made to the Registrar of Companies to deregister the Company in the Islands or in the other jurisdiction in which it is for the time being incorporated, registered or existing; and (b) all such further steps as the sole director considers appropriate to be taken to effect the transfer by way of continuation of the Compan

Planned parameter changes:

  • Day 1: Adjust new baseline emissions
  • Day 1: Adjust the DAO allocation
  • Day 1: Pause RTTM and do not adjust until we hit 20% inflation for non-DAO emissions.
  • Day 1: Turn on 10x emissions for new chains supported by the network
  • Day 7: Reduce the minimum stake for a node to 5,000 POKT.

Marketing Strategy:

  • Targeted marketing around APY/APR for new services added to Pocket Network

    • Evolve Compare Staking Services to show the best providers, and rankings of returns on all services to create competition.
    • Campaigns across specific, new service communities to attract net new POKT purchasers
    • Create a pipeline with as few clicks as possible enabling individuals to purchase POKT and immediately stake with a node provider
    • Use end to end data to determine whether initiatives or efforts are having the desired impact on demand for POKT
  • Work with KOLs to drive new narratives around Pocket Network AI adoption and opportunities.

  • Focus on partnerships with existing AI compute protocols that enhance the quality of our supply for inference

  • Reposition the brand and website to be AI-forward, emphasizing support beyond RPC (We have solved this!) and the broader vision of the network

    • AI
    • Storage protocols like Arweave, IPFS, Filecoin
    • Indexing
    • Social protocols like Farcaster and ActivityPub
  • Do the above under the domain pocket.network (recently purchased).

  • pokt.network will forward to pocket.network and pokt.foundation will be retired

  • Focus on making the technically complex narratives around Pocket Network easy to understand for the market at large


  • Continue new gateway, exchange and Shannon launch workstreams
  • Shut down all other work streams that do not drive brand awareness, $POKT demand, or relay growth.
  • Research additional sinks and demand for the token such as incentivized long-term staking and demand. Such as:
    • Airdrops based on how long your nodes have been staked e.g. If your node has been staked for 1 year vs. 5, you receive an airdrop
    • Gateway incentives

Cultural Shift:

  • Remove existing Foundation directors, Dermot O’Riordan, Jack Laing and Ben Perez.
  • Evaluate existing contractors, bring in community members and contributors from existing organizations in the ecosystem as contractors to push this effort forward.

Compensation Package

Ultimately, the success of the network will not be decided not by how much revenue we have nor how decentralized we are, but by the price of $POKT. I believe that we should be valued as a top 50 cryptocurrency, given the vision and what’s possible with Pocket Network.

I have historically ignored price, because as mentioned above, I believed the market would recognize the fundamentals if we focused on the product. This portion of the proposal is to align my incentives with yours. This compensation package is meant to be distributed across not just myself but all parties involved in this transition.

I want to aim for a total compensation for a percentage of the network. These numbers should be valued from the average trailing 30 day price, meaning that if we hit a specific price for one or two days, it does not count. We should be consistently above a given price target for the compensation to be fair.

This compensation plan should be time boxed to three years from the date of this proposal passing. The compensation should come from the DAO treasury and is contemplated in the changes to the above parameters. I am targeting a 20% dilution of the network, divided between all of the participants who help reach this goal.

All POKT that I earn will be vested over the course of 4 years on 1 year cliffs from the day that the milestone is met. This does not apply to others receiving grants.

All POKT from shipping Shannon will go to the individuals who contributed to the protocol. I am excluded personally from this grant and will only receive a grant if we reach the price milestones outlined below.

When the first $0.50 milestone has been reached I will add a 2/3 multisig as voted on by the DAO to transfer future funds over $100k.

The current total supply rounded down is at 1,680,000,000 total POKT. Aiming for a 20% total dilution, this is 336,000,000 POKT.

  1. Shipping Shannon: 48,000,000 POKT
  2. $0.50: 48,000,000 POKT
  3. $1.00: 48,000,000 POKT
  4. $3.00: 98,000,000 POKT
  5. $5.00: 98,000,000 POKT

In the current market a $5 price point would put us in the top 15 of all cryptocurrencies today. In 3 years time, I would expect a $10B valuation result in POKT realistically being in the top 50 cryptocurrencies in the world assuming that the general market increases relative to POKT as well.

Dissenting Opinions

Michael hasn’t been in the trenches, involved in the community or discourse. Why should we trust you now?

I officially stepped down from PNF in January of 2023. Since then, my focus has been on being there for the Grove team, traveling for BD and raising capital for Grove. PNF has been there for the community, and I have always answered their calls to hop on a community call or X spaces.

It’s absolutely correct that I have not been around the Den or the forums. The fact is I was burned out last year. The roller coaster ride up to $3 and down to $0.025 came with a level of euphoria and distractions that I was not prepared to handle. I have paid for that mentally, physically and emotionally over the last 24 months.

Grove is operating smoothly with a small, crack team now. The company knows exactly what it needs to build. Most importantly, I have the energy and space to turn my focus outwards now. Grove is in good hands with leadership and the team.

Knowing my job is changing - driving forth efforts to improve the token and the network allows me to create the space needed to handle it.

Wait, so no more DAO?

This proposal is meant to put the DAO and Constitution on pause for 24 months, at which point the DAO can choose to vote me out or bring in new directors. Community programs and funding has already moved to the Foundation, and I am asking for discretion on who and what gets funded from the DAO treasury. The same level of transparency in how, who and what gets funded is not changing. As outlined in the proposal I still believe that we cannot have one single point of failure for Pocket to succeed in the long run. I have already given up control through creating the DAO initially and stepping down from the Foundation with 7 figure funding. I plan on doing the same again with the benefit of lessons learned.

As mentioned above, it’s impossible for me to make changes without the community’s input or thoughts.

How can I be sure you can execute on this plan?

At Grove we’ve done the following over the last 18 months:

  • We reduced our infrastructure costs from $800k/mo to under $70k/mo in 8 months.
  • We built a recurring revenue business model on track to hit $1M ARR next quarter
  • We went from 10% of our traffic being paid to over 90%
  • A full rewrite of our backend infrastructure to be competitive with our centralized counterparts
  • Migrated from AWS to GCP with very few hiccups
  • A full rewrite of the Pocket Network protocol, leading to Shannon’s public testnet

All we have done is execute on the product and protocol since we began this journey. The difference here is that for the first time, I am setting my sights on the main thing the broader crypto market judges us on - the price of $POKT. I will be laser focused and unabashedly upfront about this.

I want to be clear - these are my ideas to create sustainable change within the token. The outcome is what’s important, not how we get there.They may work, they may not work. It may not be enough by itself. We will fail quickly, double down on what does work and learn quickly. I expect the conversation and feedback from the community to continue informing the decisions we make.

We haven’t seen traffic go up. How can you justify that Grove has executed?

The RPC market is difficult. There are 100 - 200 centralized RPC providers in the market, with many providing service for free as a loss leader to their validation businesses. As I mentioned above, Grove has gone from 10% paid traffic to over 90% in the last 12 months, and is now steadily increasing traffic either through direct customers or our gateway customers. This will be combated by bringing on as many gateways as possible and chipping away over time. Outside of gateways on Pocket that provide free traffic (completely possible), expect steady growth in this sector for Pocket Network as gateways ramp up.

Grove received a 30M grant of POKT last year. Is this not enough?

This was for Grove to retain the team in the form of grants, and at these prices the amount is negligible compared to competitors. I am advocating for this control from leading the Foundation, not Grove.

Conflicts of interest? You’re the CEO of Grove, the leading gateway provider in the network. Wouldn’t this be a conflict of interest with new gateways and post-Shannon?

The reason why it’s important that I do this is because I feel that there are very few people who can be unbiased from a practical, philosophical and moral perspective. While I want Grove to succeed, I have dedicated the last 8 years of my life to Pocket Network. As I wrote in Grove’s gateway thesis:

“Grove will be open sourcing its own Portal over the next year to activate the demand-side of the network. It is clear we are going to live in a world with hundreds (or thousands) of gateways, all solving different needs for developers. Our goal with Grove is to make it as easy as possible for existing gateway providers or new gateway providers to build lucrative gateway businesses on top of Pocket Network.”

In addition, the incentives outlined are aligned directly with the network.

This is a big shakeup. PNF is now starting to move faster. Why should we change?

This is an about-face in terms of focus and priorities. We are hovering near all time lows again after 18 months of a fully operational PNF. While PNF has critical workstreams, I believe that I am the right person to lead this effort given the experience I have had in turning Grove around. At the end of the day, I have most to lose here to make this succeed.

Legal risks?

After speaking with several attorneys, being the CEO of Grove and leading the Foundation does not materially change much within the USA. Our attorney’s view is that Pocket Network is sufficiently decentralized.

However, the SEC does not care about Pocket Network being decentralized. Through this proposal, a light may be shown on us by the broader crypto community which could alert the SEC. This could lead to a love letter. While we have a strong case in court, we don’t have the capital to defend ourselves. That is the risk.

The benefit we have is that it is election season. The SEC’s year end is September 30th. It takes time and research to send out notices, and they have already done the work that they expect to do for any future notices by their year end. Gary Gensler is likely to be replaced no matter who gets elected, leading to a lame duck leader until next year.

Why should you be the person to do this? Why not someone else?

The reason for wanting to do this comes from being one of the people that started this thing. I think a quote from the author Michael Lewis on the Tim Ferris podcast encapsulates my feeling:

“A feeling if I don’t do it, it won’t properly get done. This book should be written and that person should be me. I have an obligation to this material. Once I have that feeling, it’s a motive, and whether I’m full of myself or not, it’s a deeper and more inspiring motive than I need to make a living, I need to get on the bestseller list, I have to have something to tell my friends. It’s the highest motive, I have an obligation, I have a duty.”

What happens if this proposal doesn’t pass?

I would conclude that the community doesn’t agree with my vision, which is fair and fine. As a founder of this project, I would be frustrated and sad. Grove would continue operating and I would ultimately push the economic proposals forward regardless.


There is a lot in this proposal. I have put it all within one because our current situation merits quick change and adaptation. While I remain a firm believer in the governance model of Pocket Network, it’s evident that we need to reach a scale where its checks and balances are truly beneficial.

I care about the price of $POKT. The technical talent and brilliant community we have deserves better. At this stage in our development, it is crucial to have a fully integrated stack from the protocol, to the gateway layer, the community to move swiftly and enable others to build quickly and efficiently.

It is with this understanding that I propose taking a more centralized approach to governance and development, at least for the time being. This approach will allow us to remove barriers, streamline decision-making, and rapidly respond to the needs of our network and community.

I am profoundly thankful for the role the current Foundation has played. Their efforts have always been guided by the highest integrity and dedication to Pocket Network. The Foundation has laid the groundwork upon which we can build, and their contributions have been invaluable. However, the current situation calls for a change in strategy, and therefore, leadership, to prevent stagnation and drive the network forward.

I care deeply about the success of Pocket Network and its potential to become the routing layer for all traffic on open data sources. My commitment to this mission is unwavering. I am committed to the full, day to day communication needed for a change like this. I am embracing the need to truly care about the $POKT token price and its holders. With your support, I believe we can create a thriving ecosystem that lives up to the incredible potential of Pocket Network. Together, we can ensure that Pocket Network not only survives but thrives as the backbone of decentralized infrastructure.


Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.


With the status of the market and the resources available the last couple of months I think PNF has done a good job…This feels like punishing the Kid because they are tripping while trying to learn how to walk…


I’ll be honest, this is what it sounds like: Grove (then, Pocket Network) raises all of that VC money while being custodians of POKT. Then, they spend two years separating themselves from Pokt, rebranding and such, trying to be their own thing. Now, they return and Michael wants to be sole director and have sole discretion over DAO funds. Sounds like Grove ran out of VC money and now they want to regain control of POKT and take the funds for themselves.

I wish I could say it’s the first time I have watched this happen to a blockchain project, but it isn’t. I’ve had to go through this same situation with another blockchain project, and it did not end well.


Centralization of POKT with one “CEO” will not end well. I’ve seen this at another DAO and it ended in disaster. Having one person with the power to determine the future of POKT without any checks and balances by the community - who are the token holders - is the opposite of the ethos of crypto.


To get more details about @o_rourke’s proposal, he did an AMA in the Ecosystem Community Call today. A record number of community members showed up and asked questions.

Voters should check it out to learn more :point_down:


Still digesting. In the meantime @o_rourke can you please scrub the proposal to make all the sections self-consistent. Eg:


These are vastly different statements. (Note that the first statement is compatible with ~75% DAO allocation, while that second statement combined with 75% DAO allocation would leave way to few tokens to reward network suppliers at current relay demand.)

More importantly however:


The first statement implies that at any time after this proposal passes, the DAO could vote to rescind or modify the terms of governance effected by this proposal, including removing you as a director and placing someone else as director instead. The second statement implies that upon approval of the proposal, democracy is suspended, and you become the sole decision maker as to when and how the terms of governance outlined here are terminated or modified and democracy restored. Please clarify and make the text of what actually is being proposed crystal clear and concise. (E.g., the statement " 3. An incentive-based compensation package based on shipping Shannon and the price of $POKT probably doesn’t belong in the text of what is being proposed but rather in commentary, seeing that if you have sole discretion over the treasury, you would already be empowered to effect this plan without needing to include it in the proposal text).


@o_rourke you mention you can put guarantees in your proposal. I have heard some concerns in the community that you maybe able to allay by putting in guarantees to your proposal.

For example you can guarantee that:

  1. You will not fork the POKT network whilst being director of the Foundation
  2. The DAO will begin elections in next three years for the next directors for the Foundation. This can also be called in earlier by you if you feel the time is right to hand back reigns to the DAO.

There are probably other concerns that maybe raised in this forum that you can consider adding to the guarantee list for this proposal.


Oh, I’m just a humble astronaut, working my fingers to the bone in the vast expanse of space. I mean, who hasn’t spent countless hours and an astronomical amount of money building a protocol? Certainly not Michael, Tracy, or Jinx, the holy trinity of fraudulence! These three musketeers have been sucking the life out of this project since the dawn of time. And let’s not forget Alex Firmani, the unsung hero of mediocrity.

Michael, you may have some technical chops, but your gateway was a hot mess. I mean, seriously, who forgets to implement a proper logout flow? I could log out and log back in without even entering my email or password. Talk about security!

Now, let’s take a moment to reflect on all the ways you’ve royally screwed up:

  1. You released a press release with more fake numbers than a politician’s promise.
  2. You continued to support PoktPool, which was basically a giant vampire squid sucking 85% of staking rewards from its victims.
  3. You looted the DAO treasury like a pirate on a bender.
  4. You’ve proven time and time again that you couldn’t manage a lemonade stand, let alone a cryptocurrency project. Your burn rate is more like a bonfire of the vanities.
  5. You and your team jet-setted around the world on other people’s dime, living the high life while the project burned.
  6. You fought tooth and nail against Lean POKT, which was the project’s saving grace. You’re like the anti-hero of this story.
  7. You went AWOL for a year when the project needed you most, leaving it to fend for itself like a lost puppy.
  8. After I poured my heart and soul (and over $150k) into building POKT Wallet, you had us rebrand it to Send Wallet. Talk about a slap in the face!

I’m not here for the money I lost, I’m here for the time I wasted. I’m here because I believed in this project and convinced my friends and family to join the party. Now, I’m just another cautionary tale in the annals of crypto history. Like h5 said, I’m embarrassed to have ever been associated with this dumpster fire. But hey, at least I got a good story to tell at parties, right?

shout-out to grok.

/send it


@ethen No personal attacking please. This rule is still valid.

Why do you always use personal attacks?

You can express your ideas and ask your questions, showing yourself as an educated and thinking person.

Well well our dear beloved POKT this just keeps getting better…

Governance systems sit on a sliding scale between fair and efficient. At this time I believe we need extreme efficiency. I trust Michael to take us to the promised land.

Tempers have certainly flared in the last few days. Approaching this from “what’s best for Pocket going forward?”:

  • Unless another person/team steps up, we have the choice of Shane leading the board, or Mike coming back as proposed above.

I’d like to see the following changes to the proposal before more fully backing it:

  1. Mike should give up his roll at Grove to focus full time on PNF
    Running the foundation is a lot of work. My understanding is that Mike will replace the old directors (2.5x people) and Shane will step back down to his original role. Even if we assume Ben was splitting his time between board activities and governance work, Mike would be taking on a lot of work. To do all this AND run Grove is not a recipe for success, it will lead to either lack of focus or burnout.
    There may need to be a work around for Grove to be able to raise it’s current round with Mike’s help.

  2. Mike’s initial compensation should be linked to both shipping Shannon AND getting a listing on Binance or Coinbase
    I’m not against large compensation packages for outstanding work. If Mike gets the POKT price to $5, he can be rewarded with 98Mn POKT. I have a bigger issue with Mike being rewarded with 48mn for shipping Shannon on its own. Shannon is moving along due to Grove’s work, and I disagree that the head of PNF should be so highly compensated for Grove’s work. What is under PNF’s control is a T1 listing. So I’d like to see this compensation paid only when there is a T1 listing, or weighted heavily towards that. The other numbers I’m ok with.

  3. Suspension of Burn should be temporary
    Although there is a strong argument that the burn didn’t bring in anything substantial (2% or less) of emissions, and if we increase emissions further it will be even less- the burn mechanism itself was well implemented and gave us a long term path to deflation.
    I think the burn should be suspended to allow a bootstrapping of Gateways, but only until a certain number of relays is reached or X amount of time period. This also relates back to a COI of managing Grove and PNF - as Grove’s major supplier, asking them to give product for free to the other company one owns is a bad look and should have some guard rails in place against.

  4. Hire someone who has listed on Binance/Coinbase before
    To be clear- I had no prior warning of what happened. However, we knew Jack was leaving and I’ve had many discussions on what a perfect board might look like. Chiefly for me would be to find someone who has experience listing on Binance/Coinbase and so could help with that deliverable. I wanted to see a technical director and a business director and the listing would be under the responsibilities of the business director.

  5. DAO still has supra-control
    While I’m sympathetic to the argument of letting Mike get on with it, and there is a lot to get on with, I think it is both important, and would lessen the objections of some vociferous critics by still keeping the DAO voters as relevant and allowing a vote to be called to over-ride Mike’s decisions in an extreme scenario.
    Just as it took 75% (If I remember rightly) to oust a Director, so the DAO should be able to call a vote on Mike’s decisions (with safe guards in place to stop jamming up the system - i.e. only DAO voters can call a vote and only X times in a year) and reverse any of his decisions with a 75%+ majority.

I look forward to the next stage in Pocket’s evolution.


2. Mike’s initial compensation should be linked to both shipping Shannon AND getting a listing on Binance or Coinbase

I really like this conditional milestone for compensation. From what I heard such T1 exchanges will only entertain a listing when Shannon has been released. It just needs crossing the line to get there and everyone wins.


I’ve been listening, reading, and mulling things over. I apologize in advance for the scattershot nature of the post, but I’d rather put my thoughts up now because it takes me forever to type coherent posts, and I don’t want to miss out on the debate.

Things I like:

  • As a bagholder, the focus on price. I’ve read many a complaint – in tweet or comment form – that not enough attention was being paid to the charts. This proposal is a sea change in that regard.

  • As a hobbyist, the pivot towards AI. Spinning up yet another chain gets old after a while, and exploring the world of inference and LLMs seems new, exciting, and just enough out of my comfort zone to be interesting.

  • As a Nassim Taleb fan, the idea that the person asking to be put in charge has skin in the game. And by forgoing a salary and linking compensation to certain milestones, it helps extend the Foundation’s runway a bit.

Things I’m worried about:

  • Ceding all aspects of the network to a single person, for a couple of reasons.

    1. I’m not sure if one person has the time and wherewithal to handle all the roles of the Foundation. Marketing, BD, product, coordinating workstreams, engaging with community contributors, liasing with exchanges, among others – that’s a lot of different hats to wear. I see a nonzero chance of that work leading to burnout (again).

    2. In a situation where one person, operating without oversight, controls both the treasury and parameters of a protocol, things can go sideways very quickly (a single-point-of-failure system isn’t very antifragile). I’m not only concerned about what would happen should Mike become incapacitated or otherwise unable to perform his duties, and the logistical nightmare that would ensue. It’s also that, in the words of Francois de Larochefoucald, “no one man should have all that power.”

Other thoughts and observations

  • I won’t pretend to know how all those parameter changes would work. But I hope it’s not at odds with the tokenomics model that Shane has been working on. The 75% DAO take does seem pretty high, though. And under this proposal, it’s not really a DAO take either, it’s a Foundation (i.e. Mike) take.

  • That’s a lot of POKT in the compensation package.

  • It’s not the best optics when the person solely in charge of the protocol is also the CEO of a private company building on top of that protocol (ok, Mike, you preempted me there. Fair play).

  • This proposal has a lot of moving parts, and some need to be fleshed out more. For one thing, how sure are we about the risks posed by the SEC? I know it’s marginalized in the proposal, but it is an existential risk.

  • I appreciate that the protocol needs to be nimble and able to sprint. But sprinting is a short-term exercise. It doesn’t last three years.

  • I understand that this is intended to be a time-boxed proposal. But as the saying goes, there is nothing more permanent than a temporary solution. Three years is an eternity in crypto; and what happens if, at that time, Mike doesn’t want to relinquish control?

  • I recognize that Grove is the largest gateway, brings the most traffic, and shoulders the burden of protocol development. And having worked on the private Shannon testnet with some of the team, it’s clear that they are intimidatingly smart and focused on the task. But also… Shannon was originally slated to be shipped last year. And the continuous delays have had some knock-on effects, like hamstringing the efforts for a Tier 1 exchange listing. I can understand if people have the impression that PNF didn’t work fast enough, but it’s worth keeping in mind that a fair amount of their efforts had to be organized around the Shannon release schedule.

Modifications to the proposal I think are worth discussing, if not implementing

  • Tweaking the compensation package. I will just leave the token amounts alone for now, since I don’t know what the fair value would be; however, I would like to see two changes made.

    1. Adding a cliff vesting schedule for the price target amounts (e.g. 1 year cliff with a 1 year vest for the $0.5 and and $1 price targets; 1 year cliff with a 4 year vest for the $3 and $5 price targets). This incentivizes strategies for long-term growth, and would, in my opinion, avoid the temptation of short-term price manipulation.
    2. Expanding the milestones for the grant beyond just shipping Shannon. I agree with @cryptocorn that a T1 exhange listing should be a deliverable. In addition, considering how integral the gatewayverse is to Pocket’s success (one of the few things the old PNF guard and Mike can agree upon, it seems) I would also include open sourcing the Portal to the list, as I think it’s probably more impactful than removing the burn or bootstrapping tax.
  • Having a trial period. This proposal is a radical overhaul of the culture and ethos of the Foundation. Setting aside the ill-timed and awkward situation surrounding this PUP, I am not opposed to the idea of Michael taking the reins. But, even with his OG status and skin in the game, the fact is that he’s fallible just like the rest of us. It’s one thing to have a vision and motivation; it’s another thing entirely to execute on it (one of the lessons learned from the discussions around PEP-49). And that makes me reticent to just hand over the keys to the kingdom. Instead, why not consider keeping Shane on as director, while appointing Mike for a limited term – say, 6 months – and giving him enough resources and leeway to implement his plan. At the end of the term, the DAO could then reevaluate and decide whether to extend Mike’s tenure, possibly as sole director. Feels like this strikes a good balance between the DAO being hands off and letting Michael hustle, while still retaining oversight and the ability to step in should something unforeseen happen.

Those are my thoughts. Now what are yours?


I assume @o_rourke is aware that a T1 listing won’t be possible while the project has arbitrary tokenomics and/or centralised governance.

POKT is also at serious risk of delistings from its current CEXs if these changes aren’t communicated and explained effectively enough.


There has been a lot of talk about our marketing and I’d like to share my point of view.

Where is All Began

When I joined POKT Network we were at ~2cents, most people I talked to didn’t know about us, those that did thought we were dead, and those that remembered us often had very bad things to say - broken promises, false statements, poor performance, no customer service, zero comms.

Anywhere else, that business would be dead.

The community kept it alive.

I joined because of this community and because I saw a chance to help build POKT Network into one of the first examples of product market fit in Web3. A good product, a trusted team, a strong GTM strategy that was already attracting new Gateway businesses, actual revenue, and a path to deflation.

We weren’t blind to value.

That company would have HUGE value.

How it Played Out

Task #1 was to re-establish credibility. And, slowly but surely, we have achieved that.

Task #2 was to grow volume + partnerships and amplify the hell out of it (media, KOLs, boosted content).

We broke out of our ATLs to some extent on the belief that Grove’s fundraise signaled that breakout growth was close, and a belief that the Infura contract was the start of it, not to mention all the other 5 or 6 big partnerships that Grove announced at the same time.

Don’t get me wrong, wPOKT was a key enabler, timing was good, and people like Tony and Jinx played a huge role. But I think a lot of it was a feeling that our time had come. That growth was finally coming.

But that growth did not come.

New Year, New Plan

So we focused on attracting and onboarding new Gateways, built excitement towards Shannon (which was always imminent), rebuilt relationships with potential sources of large volume (chains), and revised the marketing strategy.

We started to scale that up.

Here is our current narrative framing. You’ll see how AI is integrated.

Here are the activities that were live / deploying:

  • We were about to start a co-marketing campaign with 2 different partners to show real world utility / adoption, built on blockchain, connected by POKT Network. Benefits were positive brand association and demonstrated utility, plus conversion mechanisms to grow volume.

  • We had KOLs engaged to share threads over the next 2-3 weeks, they would then transition over to amplify the co-marketing campaigns, with UTMs to track and optimise.

  • We had secured twitter ad credits and discounted access to Addressable to start targeted boosting of social content (ours but also that of KOLs, with their consent) + were scoping out experiments to understand different audiences and messaging.

  • We were also working on a standalone social campaign to engage people emotionally with what RPC enables (e.g. ‘when you open your wallet and it loads balances, that’s RPC’ and ‘when you ask an AI chatbot a question and it sends a prompt to a model and returns a response, that’s RPC’).

  • We have paid media contracts running in Asia and still have coverage to execute for those over the coming months to make sure our news reaches key investor communities.

  • We established a program of ecosystem partnership announcements that help us re-establish links with the chains we connect. Optimism was next and July was set to be a huge month for these collaborations. We started work on a program that would deepen these relationship w/ a focus on generating top of funnel demand for our Gateways. Driving volume.

  • We have a brand refresh almost complete that was intended to build on the current visual identity but make it more dynamic. I will share more on this soon but we were really excited by it.

  • We have wireframes for a new website that better cater for different audiences and optimise for SEO, this would link into the web app that Vojtech was building to improve ease of interaction with the token. We were planning to have that live by end of July.

What Now?

Given the breadth of the proposal and the level of dissatisfaction expressed with the Foundation’s plans and execution, it is impossible to proceed full steam ahead.

So I have paused spend wherever I can for now.

With Dermot’s resignation there are gaps that need to be filled next week and there is an event that we are committed to hosting. I’ll make sure those go smoothly.

I’m looking forward to sitting down with Mike in Brussels to better understand his vision. There are parts of the proposal that I fully support (e.g. some of the incentives), others that I will challenge (e.g. setting Gateway Fee to zero), and others I’ll leave to this community (e.g. the checks and balances discussion).

Mike is a visionary with clear skin in the game.

What I believe we need next is:

  • a solid plan for how this next phase will be resourced - execution is paramount.

  • a coordinated effort to allay the uncertainty this brings for existing Gateways.

  • a marketing plan that enables sustained value creation while driving short term impact.


One small thought on naming.

If we do standardise on Pocket Network (instead of POKT Network), we should also look at the github url, potentially the logo word mark, and the social handles.

And, if we do change the social handles, we need to make sure that we secure the current ones elsewhere and / or are very vigilant in updating the links on our linktree, website, and anywhere else. Otherwise scammers can pick up a disgarded handle and use their legitimacy to strengthen their scams.

FWIW the reason we standardised on POKT Network was not personal preference, it was just that it was the most widely entrenched version of the name.


That is not true. There is still a DAO, there are just no numerous PNF directors, but only one.

That is a lie too. Stop spreading FUD because you have a proven record of not understanding how CEXs operate. If you did, you would have secured a POKT listing on Binance already. You had almost two full years to show your skills. No exchanges will delist POKT because it changed its PNF director. Lastly, if you cared about POKT, you wouldn’t just leave immediately, putting everyone at risk with your unprofessionalism and hot-headed decision.

Please explain

I’m not spreading FUD, I want to make sure that anyone putting their time and money into POKT right now is aware of as much of the risks as possible

Please explain what I do not understand


As I have explained separately, we haven’t been listed on any additional exchanges to the ones we have enabled because 1) they are waiting for Shannon and 2) waiting to see momentum behind the project

1 Like