This is not a proposal as-is, but I think it can lead the way to a proposal. So I chose the governance category for it. If it’s not fit for this category, mods should move it where it is due. The information I use for my views are based off the info readily available in POKT docs.
Current DAO Governance consists of users who pass the requirements and objectives stated here.
To give an idea, some of the things to do in order to get a DAO vote are:
Submit a community-orientated PEP and receive a POKT grant from the DAO.
Tweet about Pocket in a meaningful way, retweeted by 3 Verified Shepherd’s or Pocket core team members.
Create a Pocket meme and get at least 5 dab reacts from Verified Shepherd’s or Pocket core team members.
These are just examples. But what they show is that inorder to become a DAO member and vote on critical proposals concerning POKT, you have to be good with social media and well connected enough to get DAO members or team members to notice you or be a very good coder.
I believe the current DAO structure should be revamped. Here are some of my reasons:
-Making team members gatekeepers of potential new DAO candidates is a big red flag of centralization. And currently, the docs suggest they are.
-DAO members do not necessarily carry any risks associated with their voting powers. Since they do not have to carry risk holding POKT in order to vote, they can vote to negatively affect the price to buy back in at times. Or if they were to sell their POKTs before a bullrun, they can simply act against the interest of the protocol due to pure anger.
-DAO members carry the value of a single vote without any ongoing costs, meaning in theory that they can simply sell their votes for personal gain. They do not need to hold any POKT or have a stake in the protocol to retain their voting powers. They have infinite value without recurring risk costs typically associated with holding governance tokens to vote.
-After a potential DAO member completes every mission or trophy, they still need 1/3 of existing DAO members to vote to get in. This means any rival to POKT, can try to damage the protocol by snowballing DAO members once they manage to get a few in, since the largest barrier to getting in the DAO is getting the DAO members to do things for you.
So this means that the POKT DAO is simply being gatekeeped by a select few. I’m sure these are well intentioned people. But no one can vouch for the future. I have seen developers or teams constantly asking the DAO members for votes on their grants and who’s to say they can’t be bribed?
If the DAO proposals were voted based on the stake a user has with the protocol, including but not limited to token amount and node amount, a vote would be significantly harder to enforce via bribe. But currently we can see that some proposals pass with 3-4 votes only. Not that hard to bribe or contact these people. (In a hypothetical scenario)
I think the current DAO voting system has not yet shown it’s vulnerabilities, but it definitely will and it might be too late to change it when that day comes where interests diverge.
I have not yet seen any plans to change this structure. I simply go off the information available on POKT Docs as any investor would do before putting their money in POKT. From an investor viewpoint, I fail to see how the DAO members chosen as described in the docs can have the projects’ best interest at all times given the reasons I previously stated. Someone who has just the right skills and time but no real stakes in POKT can have a say in the future of the network while 7 figure investors can’t… It may seem cypherpunky, but it is simply not logical.
I propose discussing the pros and cons of the current system and replacing it with a new system that does not give infinite voting power and value, free of continous risk over completing a list of trophies.