We are optimizing for total network costs, not profitability of nodes. Profitability is a function of rewards and the token. Whatsmore, even if nodes are “profitable” this leads to significant pressure on the market that needs elimination to promote a healthier ecosystem. Give this a read for insight into this problem in the Ethereum ecosystem.
I will direct you to my thesis here: PEP-35: The v0 Optimization, LeanPocket - #20 by adam - pay attention to the charts about runaway node costs. You can see the effect here.
Lowering costs one time through optimizations only kicks the can down the road rather than helping guide the ecosystem to sustainability. If we can lower node costs and control count, why not?
We can encourage node churn through economics (which has nasty consequences) or incentivize validation keeping the stakers in the ecoystem (and secures the network).
The only thing we control in this scenario are the curve (incentives). The players in the ecosystem will make their own decisions as to whether to validator or not. We cannot dictate how the unstaking happens. Attempting to coordinate could lead to a prisoner’s dillemma style event, where node runners are forced to trust in the actions of others for the optimal outcome.
Implementation wise, there is some discretion given to the Foundation to deliver an effective coordination plan that is well thought out. I will not commit to anything, but my thought was to select an effective date of the change with enough time so that people can unstake and prepare for the change. Each node runner would then decide what to do during this period and would either stay as a servicer or unstake in prepartion for validation.
For example, let us say that the announcement was made 30 days in advance of the change (assuming a 21 day unstaking period). This period would buy everyone enough time to make a change while giving the Foundation a good idea for what to expect. On day 30, the economics would take effect. In an accelerated process, the unstaking period could be reduced to 7 days, the process could be done in as little as 14 days. It is advisable that the devs make the decision on the unstaking period from a security perspective.
This is an open question. I would suggest the same unwinding period occur in the proposal that calls for GOOD VIBES’ repeal.