I’m convinced people will act in the best interests of the network and will agree to approve sensible proposals that reverse course when a better, code-driven methodology can be applied. Until then, we need to focus on controlling the costs of the network through proposals like this (and others).
I think where falls short for me is that we’re assuming people won’t act/vote in the best interest of the network. Although the community has taken some time to come around to reducing inflation and changing incentives for different parties the important point is that they have come around.
To that end, I think we’ve all learned a valuable lesson that we have to balance validator incentives with servicer incentives so that we do not end up in this position a second time.
I view this as a potential feature. We want a strong validation base. It’s an effective sink and leaves room for people to compete as servicers. The more people retreat into low-cost validation, the more inflation can be reduced, and the more we can focus on low-cost servicing.
This is an important point, as validators do act as a veto. With great power comes great responsibility - and we have to trust that validators will take that responsibility seriously. To take things a step further, this could be the case today as well, but we haven’t seen such things abused.
I wouldn’t consider this a tax as servicer returns remain stable and then increase as node count increases. An individual doesn’t make fewer rewards as node count increases, they remain stable and then increase according to the curve. The alternative is excessive inflation to maintain the current node base OR arbitrarily picking a validator % and hoping that achieves the right balance between validators and servicers.
From my perspective, this is the only reasonable tool we have at our disposal that we can leverage to control node count. While some may view it as a tax, it may be necessary until servicer stake weighting is released (if ever). Without this mechanism, things are too difficult to predict and will lead to supply-side churn.
There’s a fallacy for light client maxis that this solves all the network problems. It only temporarily solves the problems because it’s only effective at reducing the cost one time. Certainly, as we’ve seen in Pocket Network, if there is a reason to stake additional POKT on more nodes people will.
What happens when we cut costs by 50% and then double the node count?
This proposal optimizes for eliminating overprovisioning, which is where the focus needs to be.
I’m in favor of adopting a framework so there are not weeks of modeling and design plus weeks of debate every time we need to make a minor adjustment. GOOD VIBES can provide for these adjustments over time, given its flexibility. If the DAO decides it wants more or fewer servicers, this framework provides for that.
I think the importance of this proposal is that it provides stability to the network in terms of service rewards that are unpredictable otherwise. The natural incentives will grind down small node runners as they are outcompeted with better resources of the whales. Getting them to focus on low-cost validation might free up an opportunity for the little guys/gals.
To @iaa12, let’s stop kicking the can down the road and implement a solution that will get us to v1 with security. Further, let’s unroll it when facts on the ground change in a meaningful way where it no longer makes sense to spread the GOOD VIBES around.