PIP-37: Credentializing Reputation within the Existing DAO System [CREDS]

[JackALaing (Jack Laing)]

@adam

we may want to move away from sweeping changes to more focused PIPs that incrementally improve our systems

Agreed! This proposal feels like a more sweeping change because it lays the groundwork – in the form of a more robust modular architecture – for us to more easily make incremental improvements to the system. From here on out, we can issue new credentials to enfranchise new voters, use PUPs to adjust various parameters within the governance system, such as the credential weights, expiry periods, Gitcoin Passport MinimumHumanityScore, VoteSuccessThreshold, etc.

@adam

It appears as though the Foundation is given the right to decide who votes and how much that vote is worth. This appears to be a dangerous thing to delegate.

We removed this in the latest edit to the constitution PR but forgot to edit the proposal body to reflect this.

The only thing that has been delegated to PNF in the new constitution is the MinimumHumanityScore, which is in place as a safety mechanism.

You can see this under Parameter Delegates in the Constitution:

Issuing new credentials will now have to be approved by the DAO via PUPs.

@adam

I’m not sure that the threat of disenfranchisement is the best way to keep people engaged

It’s not about incentivizing engagement by threatening disenfranchisement, but ensuring that the voter base consists of those with recent context.

We talked about this in the first PGOV post:

@JackALaing

and over time the DAO is diluted by inactive voters.

It seems fair that those who would make decisions should have been active within the last 12 months.

@adam

a system that allowed engaged voters to retain their “seat” through a voter record (e.g. the DAO voter must vote on 66% or more of all proposals put to a vote)

If the DAO wished to introduce a mechanism like this, it would be as simple as issuing a new Builder Credential that recognizes voter participation. This could be automatically issued to voter accounts based on Snapshot data, under criteria such as voting on 66% of proposals in a 6-month period. There are other considerations – such as a perverse incentive to vote on proposals one doesn’t understand just to retain the voter record, which leads to the need for an abstention option in every vote – but this can be debated in a subsequent proposal if there is appetite for such a mechanism.

This is a good example of the kind of incremental improvement that this new modular architecture enables. We have 12 months in which to monitor credential activity and issue new credentials as needed.

@adam

there’s very little carveout for non-technical contributions other than creating PIPs and DAO scholars

They can also earn a vote through any successful proposal (not just PIPs), by opening a socket that pays them for their work, winning an RFP, or completing bounties. I posit that non-technical contributions should be equally capable of being paid for their work as technical contributions and if they’re paid then they’ll also earn their vote.

We have 12 months following this vote in which to issue more credentials and enfranchise a broader set of contributors. Examples might include:

• Win a retroPGF grant (see PEP-72), which includes non-technical contributions
• Organize/coordinate the community in some objectively measurable way (e.g. hosting a meetup with X attendees)
• Contribute valuable discourse on our forum, earning X likes over Y months
• etc.