PIP-37: Credentializing Reputation within the Existing DAO System [CREDS]


Authors: POKT Network Foundation (PNF)

Implementer(s): POKT Network Foundation (PNF)

Category: Governance Upgrade

Replaces: PIP-1: Upgrade Governance to Improve Voter UX

Related: the PGOV series of forum posts. In particular, the reasoning for this change is found here.


PNF proposes a governance upgrade to enfranchise more of our community as DAO Voters, based on the principle that governance power is earned through reputation and cannot be bought. This expands, rather than replaces, the existing 1-person-1-vote (1P1V) system.

The core of the upgrade is enabling verified credentials to dynamically reflect a Citizen’s reputation in the network such that:

  • Contributions to the DAO are recognised via a new set of BuilderCredentials (maintaining the existing 1-person-1-vote system, within a Builder House)
  • Contributions of productive capital staked in the network are recognised via a new set of StakerCredentials (within a new stake-weighted Staker House), which will grant voting power to Nodes, wPOKT LPs, and Gateways

These two Houses are balanced through the HouseWeights parameter, which is set to 80% Builders / 20% Stakers.

Gitcoin Passport is introduced to reinforce our 1-person-1-vote system and enfranchise anons without them having to be doxxed to obtain a vote.

This proposal also involves updates to the POKT Constitution that are required to enable the upgrade.

The new voting system will kick in two weeks from the passage of this proposal.


In August 2023 we outlined our reasoning for this governance upgrade in some detail here. Put simply, our motivation is to ensure that POKT’s best-in-class Proof of Participation model is able to scale. By modularising governance more clearly we can maintain flexibility over time, without impacting the system’s legitimacy or exposing it to capture.

The current system needs these updates to better reflect and represent POKT’s stakeholders, and to ensure that governance power continues to accrue to the “most knowledgeable and engaged” members of the community. By using verified credentials we can improve the speed, granularity and user experience of the system. With these foundations put in place, we can also start small but controlled experiments that introduce productive capital to governance.

Our motivation is to improve the existing system without opening it up to capture. Through many iterations and feedback from the community we now believe the proposal achieves this aim.


The technical specifications of the system have been previously shared in the PGOV series of forum posts. However, the governance system operates through the combination of the following:

  1. The technical architecture which defines the complete specification within this flow diagram

  2. The updated powers, laid out in the Powers and Parameters section of an updated POKT DAO Constitution. We have loaded these in a PR and linked the diff for review here
    Edit: this PR was replaced with a more focused edit following feedback from the DAO, which can be viewed here.

We will update the PR based on any final feedback or comment, and once the vote passes, we will merge the PR into the repo here: https://github.com/pokt-network/governance/tree/master/constitution

Please note: The Constitution has been restructured to provide improved readability for anyone wanting to understand POKT’s governance, as well as to make the function of parameters, and active parameter delegations, more clear. Clauses that relate to outdated functionality, or were ambiguous, operational in nature, or duplicated details of the PNF Articles, have been removed, while other clauses have been reworded for clarity.
Edit: these more sweeping changes were reverted in favor of a more focused edit, following feedback from the DAO. This focused edit can be viewed here.

There will be two Houses within the POKT DAO, which will be weighted as follows:

  • Builder House: 80% overall vote (1-person-1-vote)
  • Staker House: 20% overall vote (stake-weighted)
    • 50% Supply (Nodes / wPOKT LPs)
    • 50% Demand (Gateways)

Builder House

The Builder House will be 1-person-1-vote, enforced by Gitcoin Passport and a BuilderPowerCap parameter that is set to 1.

This means that each credential below will earn a vote in the DAO, and that 1 Vote is the maximum power regardless of how many BuilderCredentials someone claims.

We will issue credentials earned since 1st January 2023 with the expiry period starting from genesis of the new system.

Staker House

The Staker House, which holds 20% of the overall vote, will be further divided 50/50 into Supply (Nodes/LPs) and Demand (Gateways).

These will be recognized with the following credentials:

The square root is used to equalize the voting power of whales relative to smaller stakers.

Calibrating Credentials Over Time

In the Constitution, PNF has delegated power over credentials (see the Parameter Delegates section) and will be able to issue new credentials and tweak criteria for existing credentials based on feedback from the DAO.
Edit: this delegated permission was removed following feedback from the DAO. Now the only parameter that PNF would have delegated permission over is the MinimumHumanityScore, as a safety mechanism because this protects the sybil-resistance of the DAO. Issuing new credentials would now require approved PUPs from the DAO.


The system has already been designed, implemented and tested by the Microflow team. It is currently being reviewed and verified by external developers. You can review it yourself via the attached scenario here.

Implementation is focused mostly on the onboarding and migration of users with instructions captured in a new CREDS Governance Upgrade section of the POKT Docs.


The system is ready and we will start onboarding new “Citizens” from Monday 1st April. Instructions for new user onboarding can be found here.

The system also makes it possible for anyone, new voter or old, to have anonymity by following some privacy enabling practices. If you do not want to be doxxed to the DAO (or PNF) in voting you can follow these instructions.


Migrating our existing DAO Voters (whom we call OG Voters) to the new system is a major priority with the process captured here.

It’s our intention to make the onboarding and migration process as simple and effective as possible. We will be holding weekly office hours in Discord each Wednesday at 4PM ET / 1PM PST to support this onboarding. Our technology partners including Passport, Gateway and Snapshot will be available to join if needed.

System Cutover

All currently active Trophy claims (in the existing governance system) will have until the conclusion of the vote to be completed. After this, the Trophy system and all outstanding quests will be retired.

Once the vote passes, we will institute the following procedure for cutover:

  1. All active proposals in Snapshot will conclude using the existing voting system
  2. For a period of 2 weeks from the vote passing, no new votes will be activated so we can onboard and migrate as many DAO voters as possible
  3. On the 14th day after the vote’s passage, a genesis vote will be opened by PNF. This will allow a live test of the system with a special vote that we have planned. After this, new votes may be opened. These will be governed by the new system as set out in the specifications.

NOTE: You can earn your Citizenship and DAO vote starting Monday 1st April. The powers of the new system will only be activated based on the timing outlined in the cutover plan described above, but we will support (and recommend) onboarding to the system in advance of this time.

Lastly, OG Voter credentials will be issued from the date of the proposal passing and will expire after 12 months. While current DAO Voters will not be able to vote until they migrate to the new system, they will be able to do so at any time within these 12 months. However, to keep their vote after this 12-month period, they will need to re-earn it via the credentials included in the specifications (or any new credentials issued per “Calibrating Credentials Over Time”).


The rationale for the upgrade and design decisions is already captured here, here and here.

In summary, updates to the system are required to:

  • Allow anons to pass our personhood requirements. This is the rationale for using Gitcoin Passport.
  • Support more rapid, granular and automated capture of reputation for entry to our 1P1V system. This is the rationale for using mygateway.xyz.
  • Introducing Citizenship to define who can be a member of our DAO.
  • Confirming that any Citizen contributing impact to the project will earn governance power. This is the rationale for renaming the 1P1V system the Builder House.
  • Introduce controlled experiments for productive capital to participate in governance. This is the rationale for introducing the Staker House.
  • Effectively balance power between builders and stakers. This is the rationale behind the creation of the HouseWeights parameter.

By updating the Constitution, we can enact this upgrade and provide clarity to the separation of powers between the DAO and the Foundation.


Hey @b3n , what is the timeline for getting this proposal out for a vote?

I love the spirit of this, but there are many changes to understand, and I want to make sure that I have time to understand the constitutional changes and possible implications.


Ben and I have had some private conversations on the below points, but I’d like to put some thoughts in the open to gather more community input.

I do strongly believe there should be a power distribution, whether it’s tiered, points, levels etc. As such, I would change the set up of the Builder’s House. I think the idea of achieving a milestone within the Builder’s House then giving you the 1-person-1-vote weighting as everyone else could be improved upon, even though it would lead to a slightly more complicated system.

In the previous iteration of the Builder’s House, there was a points system, up to 1 point. I’d prefer this type of system, as it incentivizes community members to contribute further and be rewarded appropriately. In the proposed system above, one can make a single contribution, then gain maximum voting privileges allowed, then have no incentive from a Governance perspective to contribute further. Rewarding members for multiple contributions gives further incentive for more work to be done, and ‘rightly’ rewards the largest contributors with the most voting power.
Caveat- Ben mentioned that the points system is still able to be implemented at a later time, but I’d push for this to sooner rather later.

  • I think the sharp drop off in Decay of voting power could be reformed.
  1. we’ll potentially have a very sharp drop in 12 months as all the OG voters lose their votes.
  2. making voting power so binary feels harsh and may disincentivize vote holders from re-applying to gain voting power via completing tasks.

I’d rather see a gradual decay of voting power, over several months. This would better keep people in the ecosystem, but with reduced say on the direction of the DAO unless they re-contribute.
This may need the fractional points system implemented to be able to take effect.


I have not had a chance to read through and understand all the proposed changes fully, but intend to.

That said, as a current voter, my initial feeling is that all the work that went into getting a vote is lost with this proposal. I invested a significant amount of time completing the “node runner” path required to earn a vote when I did it. Again, I have not gone through all the proposed changes, but I thought I’d share my initial feelings/impression. Would I be willing to go through that again? I’m not sure. I need to read and understand the commitment.

I’ve tried to keep up with all the proposals since being a voter. Admittedly, I have not always been able to keep up, and my ability to invest time as an active community member ebbs and flows because, like most other community members, I have other commitments, and time is a finite resource. But, just because someone doesn’t vote or isn’t engaged for a while doesn’t necessarily mean they are no longer interested or won’t be able and willing to invest time in the future.

I’ll stop commenting here because I need to fully understand this proposal before forming a final opinion. This is an example of a time commitment I don’t always have the luxury of making. But for this proposal, it seems I have no choice because I could find out that the time I invested to get a vote was lost. I suspect other current voters might have similar feelings.


@b3n Where is the best place to comment on the proposed changes to the constitution? Should we make comments on GitHub? I posted a few comments there.

There are A LOT of changes. It seems to be a complete rewrite. Maybe I missed the community discussion on these changes. If so, can you point me to that discussion thread? If not, a conversation around the specific points in the new constitution seems like something the community should be part of.

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hey Steve, it’s really important to clarify for OG voters the big opportunities here so I appreciate you jumping in with these questions.

Just to clarify, there is nothing to “go through” again. As an existing DAO voter you are vouched into the new system and your governance power is enshrined for a minimum of 12 months. The upgrade makes explicit that by writing a proposal, winning an RFP, shipping a PR or multiple other ways that you can continue to maintain that power, but we intend to iterate with other ways that people like you who are highly knowledgeable and deeply care about POKT can maintain their vote. I am sure we will find the right balance on this.

Now is the time to address our current challenges though. Our governance system has ossified around these existing personas to a point where no one new can get governance power. We have people who have exited the network who are no longer high context and who do not care deeply about POKT’s long term success. And someone like Raidguild who built the wPOKT bridge and are currently building a gateway cannot get a vote because we do not have a “bridge building” or “gateway building” quest. This is untenable and not befitting a tier 1 project. The main change here then is to enfranchise people who are undoubtedly investing in making POKT a success and keeping them focused on shipping and it is not about forcing people to stay continually engaged.

The substantive changes to the constitution are the inclusion of the parameters and powers of the new governance system as set out in Powers and Parameters sections. Other changes can best be described as:

If you think there are substantive changes that need further discussion please outline them here so they can be clarified publicly for everyone to stay fully informed.

As I shared with Cryptocorn, none of these is excluded from being debated or activated in future. This proposal sets the foundation for creating a modular and adaptive governance model that can continue to be calibrated and improved after these important foundations are set. It’s also important to note that the proposal creates a backbone infrastructure that would be needed to enact the system Cryptocorn advocates for. So a vote for CREDS is a first step towards this type of model anyway.

We want everyone to have what they need to make an informed decision. We have been discussing this since last November in multiple posts around the technical specifications, and have hosted community calls and twitters spaces with partners around the goals, design and any trade offs. We’re willing to move heaven and earth to answer anything that is still unclear with people here in this thread, on the weekly office hours, or directly in 1-to-1’s to try to get this out for a vote next week. If anyone has unexpressed concerns or needs more information now’s the time to share!

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Builder being enforced by Git Passport doesn’t give any “builder” credit for community building. From what I can tell, I don’t qualify for a builder vote.


Thanks Jinx. You qualify for a builder vote with the OG voter credential. This credits your previous effort to earn a vote and would migrate your vote from the current system.

This raises a key difference in that the new model credits contribution mechanisms rather than an explicit set of pre-defined “personas”. For example, community builders like @thedanrodman who is providing community analytics and @counity who has been iterating on our Discord functionality and who created the new node-quest would be recognised with a builder vote because of their contributions through sockets/quick-grants.

We think the proposed changes will create a more adaptive system and can help reduce or eliminate the number of people who are locked out of voting because they don’t easily fit one of these pre-defined personas, which I think will be important as we scale with new skills and contributor types including people from AI or other aligned ecosystems. But the intention is for this to be adaptive and for the community to always have control over adding new requirements, new quests or recognising other contribution types that it believes set the right threshold for recognising someone as “engaged and knowledgeable” with a vote. That ability to adapt and calibrate as we go is a core feature of what we want to create.


Sounds good, and I recognize that intention. I’ve found that in metrics which include git commits in the past (in other orgs), as part of a greater qualitative analysis, there’s been a tendency to weight code contributions more highly simply because they’re easier to quantify. It will be important to this initiative to be proactive in keeping the observation of contributions “3D”.


I agree… community building is foundational to OSS projects and needs to be weighted correctly. I hope together we can identify what are the best “commits” for community builders.


Hey @b3n I’ve spent the last few days going through the expansive changes being proposed by this PIP.

I’ve shared some of my questions and concerns with you and @JackALaing. With this comment, I will start making my questions visible to the community.

Of all the things we vote on, changes to the constitution are the most important in my opinion. So, I’ll start my comments/questions there. I’ll also hold off on my other thoughts for now in hopes of keeping the discussion focused on one issue at a time.

The changes are not just updates to the constitution—they are a rewrite. Further, some changes violate the original (read: existing) constitution.

8.1. This Constitution may be amended according to Majority Approval in the PIP > process, unless otherwise specified in ‘Immutability’ and ‘Undo’ below.


8.2. No Constitution amended to modify clauses or definitions marked with a ‡ will be accepted under any circumstance except per 8.6.

8.3. Constitutions amended to introduce a ‡ will be accepted if they have first received Supermajority Approval in the PIP process.

8.4. No Constitution amended to modify clauses or definitions marked with a †, or to introduce a †, will be accepted unless the proposed amendment has first received Supermajority Approval in the PIP process.

For starters, the Immutability section has been - well, muted. This is the only violation necessary to invalidate the changes per the existing constitution. But there are multiple others. To keep focused, I won’t detail the others now because the main point is that we don’t need a constitution if we can rewrite it at any time.

4.10. The Foundation shall serve as a custodial entity for Pocket Network, deferring decision-making to the Council in all cases except Material Adverse Exception Events (MAEEs), i.e. crises resulting from incomplete contracts and unforeseen events.

My second point is that the current constitution does not appear to be linked to in the Pocket documents or on the website anymore. It used to be linked in the documents, but it seems all those links have been removed. Perhaps this was an oversight and maybe it feels like a minor point, but it kind of seems like the updates are being assumed before a vote has happened. This is arguably another violation of the current constitution.

This is also true for information about the current voter paths. They are no longer in the documentation. So, anything that links to details about our current process is now a dead link. If someone wants to compare the existing process to get a vote to the proposed method, all they will find is the newly proposed process. For example, if you visit this post on the messari site, which discusses our current system, you’ll notice all the links are dead. Again, this feels like a decision has been made without a vote.

6.2. PIPs will not be permissible if they contain multiple new specifications that could feasibly be divided into separate proposals without losing their meaning. This is in place to prevent omnibus proposals, whereby unpopular proposals are pushed through by bundling them with popular proposals.

So, I’m not just pointing out issues without suggesting a resolution; here is my suggestion.

  • Make changes to the constitution with amendments - like the current constitution suggests
  • Keep the changes focused on credentialing and reputation

There are too many significant changes conflated into this one proposal. I’ve spent over 12 hours reviewing the changes and considering their implications, and I still don’t feel like I fully understand them.

At this point, I would vote against this proposal for that reason alone—it conflates too many things, and I suspect most voters won’t have the time to consider them properly.


Thanks @steve for the feedback and for taking the time to review the proposal.

On constitutional amendments

we don’t need a constitution if we can rewrite it at any time.

Constitutions include processes to amend them (metagovernance). Our amendment process is the PIP, as defined in 8.1, which we are following. Therefore these changes would be in accordance with 8.1 if the proposal passes.

We are also retaining the current amendment process in the new constitution via 7.1:

7.1 Amending the Constitution: An amendment to this Constitution, including the introduction of new Parameters, shall be considered ratified and adopted upon securing an affirmative Vote that meets or exceeds the ConstitutionAmendmentThreshold.

We included the removal of the immutability clauses in our proposed amendments because they have not been used to date (no clauses have the markings referenced), and we feel it is still premature to ossify clauses within our constitution, so all possible changes are essentially subject to 8.1 (majority approval). If at a later date we felt the need to ossify, there is nothing stopping us from reintroducing clauses like this through another PIP.

On documentation

The docs are a little messy right now because they’re going through a refactor but the docs for the existing system can be found here, under Governance – Earn Your Vote | POKT DOCs.

It looks like the Node Runners sub-page was accidentally dropped during a larger refactor edit by one of our contributors, so I’ve restored that page, but every other voter path was in there.

The constitution is also linked on this page DAO (OS) | POKT DOCs and can be found in the official governance repo GitHub - pokt-network/governance

On significant rewrites / bundling amendments

We included the amendments we did because they are, in our opinion, long overdue updates that ultimately improve the constitution.

However, I appreciate that there isn’t much context on why each of these changes are being proposed. We had hoped that the diff in GitHub would provide transparency into changes but I can see that 1) the restructure makes it harder to follow, 2) the diff doesn’t include justifications. I am going to correct this by following up here with a document that outlines all of the proposed changes with justifications.

If there is pushback on the bundling of constitutional amendments that do not directly relate to the functional upgrade that is CREDS, we are happy to open a new PR for this proposal with a narrower set of amendments, then defer the other amendments to a longer participatory process.

In any case, whatever the preferred path forward on timing/sequencing, we do feel strongly that a constitutional refactor is necessary, including all of the changes that are included in the current PR.


Thanks for the follow up on this @JackALaing

I think this is a step in the right direction.

This is a better approach in my opinion.

New question

Can you explain how new voter paths are created going forward? For example, if in the future some new group feels disenfranchised, do we have to go through this process again?

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A key part of this proposal is the modular architecture which defines a new set of governance parameters that can be delegated to PNF in the same way that the RelaysToTokensMultiplier, ServicerStakeWeightMultiplier, and MaxApplications are on-chain protocol parameters that were delegated to PNF.

The table of BuilderCredentials is itself a parameter that is proposed to be delegated to PNF. Each BuilderCredential represents one “path” to obtain a full vote in the DAO (where everyone in the Builder House is limited to 1-person-1-vote). So merging a PR to GitHub, winning an RFP, submitting a successful proposal, etc, these are each paths to a vote.

Delegating this parameter to PNF means that PNF is granted the authority by the DAO to modify credentials and to issue new credentials. In consultation with stakeholders over time, or through recommendations from the community/DAO, PNF would have the ability to issue new BuilderCredentials without having to go through a lengthy proposal process.

In other words, we are establishing a more dynamic system that makes it easier for us to mint new voter paths as needed. Examples might include:

  • Win a retroactive public good funding grant
  • Organize a community call / local meetup
  • Stake X nodes / serve X relays

Thanks, @JackALaing. This is what I thought and also a concern of mine.

This change to the constitution gives PNF 100% authority over who gets to vote going forward. As a result of this PIP, the DAO/community will no longer truly have a say over what it takes to get a vote, and this could also mean no say in what proposals get passed.

To illustrate my point, PNF could create a new path that gave everyone who attended a community call a vote. Then, PNF could create content on the website and in the docs to promote any new agenda and put it to vote. I’m not saying that would happen, but PNF would have the authority and power to do that.

That control, along with control over all the information on the website and documentation, gives PNF everything needed to ensure the outcome of any vote.

I trust you, @Dermot, @b3n, and the rest of the PNF team. But this isn’t the way if we’re trying to create a governance model that works regardless of our levels of trust in one another.


hey Steve, it’s a really good point to align on. Like you, my bias is to have a more trustless model as much as possible… provided that isn’t at the expense of the systems legitimate need to adapt in service of its goals. This was the issue with the old system… it ossified around paths and personas that don’t represent the evolving spectrum of POKT stakeholders.

Any powers PNF is delegated is for the DAO to decide and should be enshrined in a way that makes you and other members of our community comfortable that the right checks and balances are in place. And to be clear, delegating to PNF was for us a shorter term solution to enable further infrastructure and expertise around the system to be built in the DAO, which these powers could be delegated back to.

Perhaps changing the delegation so that PNF proposes new credentials direct to the DAO for a vote is preferred? Or perhaps the community implements their own public mechanism for making recommendations on new credentials to be created with a timelock that PNF has some control over before enabling. We just want clarity how it is operated so that we can balance capture resistance and any adversarial factors against the legitimate need for a reputational system that is dynamic and responsive and can grow with POKT for the next 3-5 years and beyond.

Do you have a preferred solution in mind for how this should be operated or expressed in governance? I don’t know the depth of feeling around this but it would be great to hear more perspectives from you and other voters.

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Thanks for your response, @b3n, and for the many DMs from me that you and @JackALaing have responded to regarding this PIP.

As I’ve said, I respect and trust the current PNF team. However, we are all aligned in wanting a system that can be trusted regardless of who is leading PNF in the future. So, from my perspective, this is not about getting comfortable now. It’s more about keeping us comfortable over the next “3-5 years and beyond”.

Why is a complete overhaul of the constitution necessary if the main goal is “to enfranchise more of our community as DAO Voters”?

I will personally help ensure that anyone who wants a vote gets one

The current system for getting a vote does not disenfranchise anyone. To get a vote under the current system, you simply need to commit some time. There are no other barriers. If you can read and respond to this comment, you have the skills to get a vote.

So, I would be willing to create a course and hold a monthly meeting to guide anyone interested through the process of getting a vote. No experience or technical skills are required; just a time commitment. In addition to my willingness to do this, I know other OG voters who would be willing to help to ensure it’s sustainable. So, if anyone wants a vote and is willing to invest a little time, we can ensure they get one.

Getting a vote is too hard, and I don’t want to be doxed

If you disagree with my assertion that anyone can get a vote today, I’d like to understand why. If you answer that the time commitment is too much or that you don’t want to be doxed, those are different than claiming that people are being disenfranchised.

If the actual viewpoints are that the process should be easier and that anonymous voting should be allowed, I get it. Getting my vote took months, and I almost didn’t do it because of the time commitment. I also wasn’t sure I wanted everyone to know my viewpoint because I have strong opinions - as I suspect you now know by now. But again, those reasons are not the same as being disenfranchised. When people are disenfranchised - they don’t have the right to vote. In this case, everyone has the right even if they are not willing or able to invest the time. Or are not willing to be doxed.

Is it about who has the voting power?

So, assuming reason prevails here, you see my logic as to why nobody is actually being disenfranchised. And why I’m questioning the reasoning behind a push to overhaul the Constitution and voting process so radically.

Of course, a more automated process that scales would be necessary if the objectives are less about enfranchising people and more about the opinions that more voters are needed, or that we need voting terms, or credentialing should be revised. If that’s the root reasoning behind this proposal, let’s discuss it without the propaganda.

Your question: Do I have a preferred solution in mind? The short answer is no. But that’s because I’m still trying to determine this proposal’s primary objective and the reasoning and motives behind it.

The “disenfranchised” narrative doesn’t hold up to fundamental reasoning. Plus, using that word in this context minimizes its true meaning, which makes me a bit agitated. We don’t need more content on the web that future LLMs will use to minimize the contextual meaning of something like what it means to be genuinely disenfranchised. But that’s my emotions - back to reasoning.

As I’ve expressed, this proposal is too complex and conflates too many things. So, perhaps you could state the primary objective, and I can try to respond to your question about how I think it could be operated or expressed in governance.

So, what is the primary objective of this proposal?

If you can answer the question above objectively in a sentence, I’ll gladly share my suggestions. Perhaps the main objective is one of the following:

  • Make it easier for people to get a vote
  • Limit the control of the small group of existing voters
  • Remove current voters who are no longer active
  • Empower PNF with more control over the voting process
  • Automate the voting process

Whatever it is, let’s make it clear so everyone can weigh in. I know nobody wants people to be “disenfranchised” from understanding what this proposal is really about. :wink:


Hi Steve, Thanks for asking these questions and highlighting the need for a more effective way of making sure key information hasn’t been missed.

Hopefully this answers your main question:

The objectives are described here in our first post from August 2023: PGOV1 - Evolving Pocket’s Governance: Introducing 3D Governance

As you can see it specifically calls out the objectives, challenges and proposed solutions, starting with:

While community feedback over the last 6 months have evolved the specifics, the objectives and reasoning remain unchanged. Although we linked this in the proposal above, we didn’t explicitly call it out as containing our detailed reasoning which was a mistake. I will add it to the proposal.

If we are being precise then it’s important to state that I/we haven’t used the word disenfranchised anywhere. Saying ANY builder who attains a particular credential, and not just those named personas or paths in the existing system, reaches my threshold for saying enfranchised but I’d need more time to think on the semantics. Were Stakers, who can now use an adapted token weighting method to vote via their Stake included before?

Questioning whether Stakers or Investors or Gateways are already included highlights an important reason we think the proposed change is helpful:

I hope this gives a bit more clarity. Let us know!

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Thanks again @b3n for your response.

The reasoning for my posts is that the objectives are not clear, in my opinion. That’s why I’m trying to restate what I think I understand. I might be the only one in the community who isn’t exactly clear, but I’m guessing that’s not the case. So, all I’m asking for is a bit of clarity.

So, asked another way, am I correct in saying that the reasoning for the change is the following:

  • Make it easier for people to get a vote
  • Limit the control of the small group of existing voters
  • Remove current voters who are no longer active
  • Empower PNF with more control over the voting process
  • Automate the voting process

Again, I’m just trying to understand and, hopefully, help others understand the purpose of this PIP.

Again, I’m just trying to clarify the objectives in simpler terms.

To continue being precise, the word enfranchise—used in the context this PIP is using it—means to give someone the right to vote. Everyone has the right to vote now—some just choose not to go through the current process. But you imply that some don’t have the right, which is misleading, in my opinion.

Back to the point

Am I misleading anyone by saying this PIP aims to do the following?

  • Make it easier for people to get a vote
  • Limit the control of the small group of existing voters
  • Remove current voters who are no longer active
  • Empower PNF with more control over the voting process
  • Automate the voting process

Ok great, will address your list directly:

This is not an objective but in some cases is an ancillary benefit. The current system is unequal when it comes to effort requirements across the different personas. It is about making the requirements more even, not easier. For people who are knowledgeable, engaged and contributing, in some cases it will be easier to get a vote. For others, who now might have to make direct contributions like having a PR accepted to a Shannon or Morse repo, it is arguably harder.

This is not an objective at all. What we do want is to reverse the inertia in voters and to have a more scalable definition (builders and stakers) that can grow with the DAO

This is an objective. The current system aims to have the “most knowledgeable and engaged” people as voters in the DAO, but does not meet its own standard when voting power is for life. It is not possible to be engaged if (over some time horizon) you are no longer active.

This is not an objective and it would not be a benefit. If it was not explained clearly enough here then I can say now that we will change the delegation of this parameter to being DAO controlled. This will mean the addition of any new credentials can only happen via a DAO vote unless an alternative operating mechanism is proposed by someone.

This is a primary objective. The current system is a bunch of discord tags administered by one centralised actor. Verified credentials are a way of automating the existing trophies and provide further programatic benefits for efficiency and innovation.

If it has not come through already then the other key objective is to unbundle reputation from “personas”. If we do not do this, we will always be chasing our tail to define new personas and plug gaps as the ecosystem evolves. The current system rewards an action (with a trophy) for one persona, but a different persona completing this same action would get no such reward. This creates a path dependence that to me is at odds with the idea of reputation itself. We are all “builders” of POKT and forcing ourselves to splinter into different personas or tribes does not serve a clear purpose.

Below I try to highlight the changes between the current and future state. I hope it can help communicate the nature of the upgrades we are pursuing and how much of this is an evolution (with some tweaks!) on what we already have.