Thanks @Dermot (&PNF) for putting this together.
So basically we are taking a more qualitative approach (instead of a quantitative) to arrive at a valuation model.
Intellectually speaking, I would like to further clarify your following lines:
It depends on what kind of public good we are talking about.
The air we all breathe can be considered a public good and I agree that it is hard to quantitatively value air and assign a number.
But on the other hand, public blockchains and protocols are public goods that can be quantitatively valued, and very conveniently because the metrics and their definitions are available in the industry today. Referring back to the debate I started on den about Pocket Network’s financials. A followup is due there.
Protocol is a public good, DAO is a non-profit, foundation is a non-profit; however the entities that are building on them most likely would be for-profit.
We could come up with a fully quantitative valuation model for the for-profit entities building in the eco-system but we don’t have the means to go and audit their inputs, that most likely would be “cost based”. I mean nothing is on-chain and it would be hard to standardise and templatise. I guess we could but that would involve a lot of trust and conflicts.
The challenges above apply to “reimbursement” type compensation.
And therefore I agree with the “IMPACT” based evaluation model.
Questions/Concerns/Suggestions:
@Cryptocorn has already asked the question about who will do the evaluations. I agree with the committee approach. I believe @Cryptocorn , @zaatar suggested PNF + GRIP + DAO member + Community member, or something similar.
And I sincerely recommend proactively managing possible centralisation/concentration, abuse of authority, unhealthy coalition formations, etc through timely rotations and other measures.
More on this here and here . Not trying to be a cynic, this is just risk/conflict/COI management.
So committee’s role will be to sanction or not sanction the grant? Or to decide whether to promote the ask for a DAO vote or not? Because those two are very different in terms of empowerment, and also in other factors such as time and efficiency.
Ok, I arrive at my favourite topic- how will we budget this?
Hypothetically, what if there are 15 requests and each at 4% of the treasury? That’s 60% of the treasury. It’s improbable but not impossible.
Moving forward, we would ideally want more and more high quality proposals. The responsible way forward is to factor those low probability scenarios as well.
And therefore I re-appeal to PNF and to the DAO- we need budgeting and planning.
The DAO treasury is not infinite and therefore will require rationing at times, which will only happen if we do budget planning.
Reiterating that my comments have no connection with the ongoing reimbursement debates.
Thanks to you and @b3n for the above and thanks for reading.