# PUP-15: GOOD VIBES (Updated Version 1.1) - A New Economic Policy for Pocket Network **URL:** \ **Category:** Parameters\ **Created:** [June 2, 2022, 2:48pm UTC](https://forum.pokt.network/t/pup-15-good-vibes-updated-version-1-1-a-new-economic-policy-for-pocket-network/3037 "2022-06-02T14:48:51Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 1\ **Showing post:** 20
**Author:** ![adam](https://forum.pokt.network/user_avatar/forum.pokt.network/adam/32/217_2.png) [@adam](https://forum.pokt.network/u/adam)\ **Post date:** [June 4, 2022, 7:38pm UTC](https://forum.pokt.network/t/pup-15-good-vibes-updated-version-1-1-a-new-economic-policy-for-pocket-network/3037/20 "2022-06-04T19:38:55Z")
> [@doddric](#): > > - Lastly on unstaking grace period. Would this be extended to servicers currently unstaking or those who may unstake prior to the potential approval of this or only those who unstake after? It would be designed to provide an even playing field for liquid or currently staked POKT. > [@doddric](#): > > -I don’t see anything regarding the minimums to become a validator. Or rather the amount of block producing validators. Is that spelled out somewhere that I missed? At the moment, there are 1000 validators. That could change via a proposal. > [@lex](#): > > I would like to challenge Adam’s status as Least Popular Proposer and suggest that we can drive the latter number down to as low as 100M POKT. I’m open to further deceases, but every time I’ve proposed something to this extent, it’s been HIGHLY unpopular. I’ll point to: [PUP-12: Inflation Stop-Gap Proposal: Double Trouble](https://forum.pokt.network/t/pup-12-inflation-stop-gap-proposal-double-trouble/2011) as an example. I built in a mechanism for accelerating decreases to the mint rate above and beyond a proportionate decrease. That would look something like this @lex : ![image](https://forum.pokt.network/uploads/default/original/1X/cda84e41b33ce669fc0fb3de6fe1dd176a621041.png) ![image](https://forum.pokt.network/uploads/default/original/1X/484d66fe2fbe07e02fa9a9a81e0f83f969ddd356.png) Inflation would be about 105M at the MVNC. If I hear others call for this, I’ll edit the proposal. > [@addison](#): > > The current stake of all unjailed, not unstaking nodes is 694,032,657.88. The average validator stake is 17,256.17, and the average servicer stake is 15218, not 17499. Looks like an oversight. I’ll get in there and correct things. Thanks @addison. > [@poktblade](#): > > - Node count increasing results in high infrastructure cost → Not necessarily true, this is solvable by the light client with the fraction of the cost. While I’m heavily in favor of the idea of the light client, I am thinking that there is a non-zero cost to the light client, as light as it may be. Meaning at the end of the day, more clients = more costs. According to Addison, these costs are very much non-zero At 50% of the cost, low long until we’re at 80K or even 160K nodes? What does that mean for network cost? It’s a little too early, in my opinion, to consider that the silver bullet until it plays out in reality. Further, why not do both? Operate at a more ideal node count, with very low costs? Seems like a win-win to me. > [@addison](#): > > Someone with alot of unlocked tokens would be able to take advantage of this immediately after the proposal passes and quickly take control of the validator set. There is an incentive here to act quickly, and take control of as many validators as possible in order to earn these maximal rewards. In an ideal scenario, this would be well coordinated and node runners would have a chance to get ahead of the changes meaning that changes wouldn’t take effect until everyone has had a chance to make their moves. It should be an even playing field. If someone does want to front-run, they’d be securing the network. > [@addison](#): > > There is also an outcome where this whole thing doesn’t make sense since it is -ev to enter a validator bidding war. We’ve seen this continually with launching new service nodes; therefore, I’m not sure I follow the logic. Further, unstaking penalties make it costly to marginally decrease your stake. > [@addison](#): > > This incentive is big enough for someone to stake additional liquid pokt that they have into validators, but it is not big enough to incentivize people to unstake and consolidate into validators. At current costs, it definitely is. Post-light client, we will see. To your point, I think you can have the best of both. Liquid POKT is staked on validators (great) and we have low cost servicers with the light client (also great). I think where the rubber meets the road is with node running services which will offer validation services that put little strain on the market. > [@shane](#): > > Validators become far more powerful than what is necessary to secure the network. We highly inflate block production rewards instead of fixing servicers. The lean client or weighted stake actually fix the servicer issue vs creating a new class of nodes competing nodes. Let’s do both? > [@shane](#): > > Upping the block reward for validators, or expanding the number of validaors is more than enough of a solution without having validation compete with the servicers, adding complexity to the ecosystem. I’m convinced that incentives overcome the complexity that this introduces. > [@shane](#): > > The lean client or weighted stake solutions actually fix the servicer issue vs creating a new class of competing rewards. Given [PUP-14: Increase MaxValidators to improve economic security - #29 by addison](https://forum.pokt.network/t/pup-14-increase-maxvalidators-to-improve-economic-security/2975/29), it feels like we need this. The simple solution would be to just up the validator incentive arbitrarily, but I think you run the risk of migration back to servicing if not dynamically adjusted, jeopardizing network security. > [@poktblade](#): > > As POKT begins to onboard more and more chains, it does not economically make sense for a validator to earn remotely as close to a servicer. Keep in mind that there is a 15 chain limit per servicer. It’s not like costs per servicer vary based on how many chains Pocket Network Supports. > [@poktblade](#): > > How does these changes affect V1.0? I think this is a separate issue that GOOD VIBES does not intend to address. See below: > [@adam](#): > > This proposal is not a replacement for stake weighting, but it’s a stop gap until stake weighting is released. --- _[View the full topic](https://forum.pokt.network/t/pup-15-good-vibes-updated-version-1-1-a-new-economic-policy-for-pocket-network/3037)._