Oversight: Why It’s a Must, Revisited
New evidence has emerged on why DAO oversight is an absolute necessity if Mike assumes control of PNF.
In a previous post, I focused on two good reasons for an oversight body:
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Address conflict of interest concerns by rejecting actions that benefit Grove at the expense of the DAO and other Pocket Network participants
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Preserve decentralization of Pocket to maintain confidence of contributors and investors for whom it’s critical, and avoid regulatory/SEC problems
Now another big reason has come into view.
The “new” evidence is the manner in which this proposal has unfolded. The first version called for changes to the Articles and the Constitution. Jack observed (July 5) that the precise wording of any changes had to be set out in the proposal. If the proposal’s approved, these amendments have to be adopted as is. Mike can be forgiven for overlooking this requirement initially since he may have been unfamiliar with the intricacies of legislative change.
However, even after Jack pointed this out, Mike failed to notice. Or if he did notice, it failed to register. We know he read Jack’s post because he said he’d updated PIP-38 to include the legislative changes it recommended. But he added that the exact wording would be worked out if the proposal passed:
Still No Precise Wording
On July 11, Mike posted the revised version of PIP-38. Again, it failed to contain the precise wording of the changes to the Constitution and Articles, in disregard of Jack’s warning. As a result, the revised proposal has been marked “invalid.”
Decisions Might Overlook Relevant Considerations
All this goes to show that Mike, however well-meaning, could make decisions that overlook relevant considerations. This makes the need for oversight all the more vital.
Mike himself recognizes the need for others’ input:
Oversight, both before and after changes are actually implemented, must be built into the system. The right to vote Mike out of office every 6 months is not enough.
Areas Where DAO Should Keep Jurisdiction
Mike wants to be able to control the economic levers of the protocol. He specifies non-DAO inflation; new-chain emissions; node-runner minimum stake; DAO allocation; and burn for Gateways. Subject to proper oversight, that leeway is acceptable.
However, the DAO ought to retain its existing control over other aspects of the project.